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Grow old along with me!
The best is yet to be,
The last of life,for which the first was made....
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Wirtz Report,2 the Secretary of Labor's report that served as the basis
for the 1967 Age Discrimination in Employment Acte (ADEA), opened with
Victorian poet Robert Browning's hopeful lines about aging. Reporting that
"[a] century later, reality still has not caught up with that poetry,"4 Secretary
Willard Wirtz identified harsh financial and psychological consequences for
older Americans due to age discrimination in employment 5 And the
consequences did not stop with current and discharged older workers: they
affected the whole society through lower productivity and higher
unemployment insurance payments.6
Thirty-five years later, as the courts increasingly focus on corporate profit
maximization, Browning's lines ring with irony for older workers as the
following scene is repeatedly played out. An older worker, over forty or fifty
years of age, is called into his supervisor's office and terminated. He may have
received excellent performance reviews up to the time of his termination,7

accompanied by periodic merit and cost-of-living raises. But his very
achievements are now working to his disadvantage. Because his salary is

comparatively high, the corporation wants to hire a younger, less expensive
worker to do his job.8 Whether the termination involves a single worker or is
part of a wider downsizing, the supervisor may be quite direct about her reason

1. ROBERT BROWNING, Rabbi Ben Ezra, in DRAMATIS PERSONAE (1864), reprinted in 1
ROBERT BROWNING, THE POEMS 781, 781 (John Pettigrew ed., 1981).
2. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER: AGE DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR TO THE CONGRESS UNDER SECTION 715 OF

THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (1965) [hereinafter WIRTZ REPORT].
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
4. WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 2, at 1.

5. Id. at 55-57.
6. Id. at 53-55.
7. See EEOC v. Clay Printing Co., 955 F.2d 936, 938-39 (4th Cir. 1992) (finding no violation of
the ADEA where five employees at least 40 years old were terminated without evidence of prior
complaints orreprimands); Graefenhain v. Pabst Brewing Co., 827 F.2d 13,15-16 (7thCir. 1987) (finding
anADEA violationwhere two employees over40 years old were terninated despitereceivingconsistently
superior performance reviews), overrded on othergrounds by, Coston v. Pltt Theatres, Inc., 860 F.2d
834 (7th Cir. 1988).
8. See cases cited infra note 11.
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for it.9 She knows that the courts are unlikely to afford a remedy to a worker
terminated on economic grounds."
This development is relatively recent. For about twenty-five years after the
ADEA became effective, most of the federal courts considering the issue held
that salary-based terminations1 and other economically-based discrimination
against older workers 12 were not permitted. The reasoning behind these
opinions seemed consistent with the Act's objectives.' 3 Indeed, one court
observed that if older workers can be terminated because
h4 of their higher
salaries, "then the purpose of the ADEA will be defeated.'
The business climate began to shift in the 1980s, as businesses increasingly
focused on bottom-line profits at the expense of other interests." Even
prosperous firms laid off workers in a quest to become "lean and mean."' 6

9. See, e.g., Culley v. Trak Microwave Corp., 117 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1321-22 (M.D. Fla.
2000) (granting summary judgment for an employer who terminated an employee for explicitly
economic reasons).
10. See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
11. See Jardien v. Winston Network, Inc., 888 F.2d 1151, 1157-58 (7th Cir. 1989);
Uffelman v. Lone Star Steel Co., 863 F.2d 404,408 (5th Cir. 1989); Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc.,
828 F.2d 1202, 1207 (7th Cir. 1987); Graefenhain,827 F.2d at 21; Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe
State Coll., 702 F.2d 686, 691 (8th Cir. 1983); Franci v. Avco Corp., 538 F. Supp. 250,259 (D.
Conn. 1982); Marshall v. Arlene Knitwear, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 715, 728 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), affd
inpart,rev'd inpart,608 F.2d 1369 (2d Cir. 1979). Butsee Mastie v. Great Lakes Steel Corp.,
424 F. Supp. 1299, 1319 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (citing former 29 C.F.R. § 860.103(h) to find that
salary can be a reasonable factor on which to base the termination of an individual, but not a
group); Donnelly v. Exxon Research& Eng'g Co., 12FairEmpl.Prac. Cas. (BNA) 417, 421-22
(D.N.J. 1974) (holding that the termination of an older worker whose salary had outpaced his
productivity did not violate the ADEA).
12. E.g., EEOC v. Chrysler Corp., 733 F.2d 1183, 1186 (6th Cir. 1984) (holding that forced
early retirements based on economic necessity violated the ADEAunless certain tests were met);
EEOC v. City of Altoona, 723 F.2d 4, 5, 7 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding that a statute based on
economic considerations that required termination of workers near retirement violated the
ADEA); Dacev. ACFIndus., Inc., 722 F.2d 374, 378 (8thCir. 1983) (holding that the demotion
of an older worker to save money could violate the ADEA); Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d
1027,1032-34 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that refusal to hire teachers with greater experience
violated the ADEA); Laugesenv. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307,313 (6th Cir. 1975) (finding that
termination based on length of service, a factor inevitably related to age, would violate the
ADEA).
13. See infra note 27 and accompanying text.
14. Leftwich, 702 F.2d at 691 (holding that terminating older, more experienced professors
for economic reasons violated the ADEA).
15. See Michael Useem, Corporate Restructuring and OrganizationalBehavior, in
TRANSFORMING ORGANIZATIONs 44,53-55 (Thomas A. Kochan & Michael Useem eds., 1992)
(stating that in the mid to late 1980s, corporations became increasingly focused on shareholder
welfare at the expense of the interests of other corporate stakeholders); Louis Uchitelle & N.R.
Kleinfield, On the BattlefieldsofBusiness,Millions of Casualties,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1996, at
AI (noting "the stem insistence of Wall Street on elevating profits even if it means casting off
people").
16. Karen E. Mishra et al., PreservingEmployee Morale During Downsizing, SLOAN
MGNrr. REv., Winter 1998, at 83, 83. See also COMM'N ON LEGAL PROBLEMS OF THE ELDERLY,
ABA, DOWNsiZING IN AN AGING WORK FORCE 3 (1992) (reporting that according to Eric
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Management used phrases like "downsizing," "re-engineering," "reduction in
force, "and its abbreviated form, "RIF," to characterize the terminations less
bluntly.' 7 Unlike the traditional word "layoff," these terms suggest not a
temporary condition, but "the permanent interruption ofthe employee's job."'8
Meanwhile, senior executives' pay, which was often tied to stock prices, rose
dramatically, sometimes contemporaneously with layoffs.' 9 The business
climate became one that had "little respect for human dignity or welfare. 20
Courts responded to these changes by gradually shifting their views of
salary-based terminations. However, instead of recognizing a need to protect
older workers caught in this wave of profit-driven decisions, courts
increasingly approved business profit as a justification for terminating older
workers.2'
This Article argues that it is bad public policy to allow unfettered salarybased terminations of older workers. Whether a policy is good or bad is to
some extent a matter of opinion. However, empirical evidence and commentary
from the disciplines of economics, business, psychology, and sociology show
the negative effects of the current policy. Part II will present an overview ofthe
legal and economic background concerning this issue. Part III will examine
scholarship and commentary demonstrating that the current case law creates
bad public policy. Part IV will discuss what values ought to be applied to the
problem. Part V will show that courts can apply current law to protect against
salary-based terminations. It will further suggest legislative changes to address
the problem if the courts do not do so.

Greenburg, editor of the American Management Association's research reports, downsizing is
"an ongoing corporate activity without regard to a company's economic performance"); JILL
ANDRESKYFRASER, WHITE-COLLARSWEATSHOP 41 (2001) (reporting that successful companies
are laying off older workers partly in order to replace "higher-paid, older workers with less
expensive junior [workers]"); Kenneth P. De Meuse et al., Announced Layoffs: Their Effect on
CorporateFinancialPerformance,33 HuM. RES. MGMT. 509, 510 (1994) (naming prosperous
companies that laid off workers); Enid Mumford & Rick Hendricks, Business Process ReEngineeringRIP, PEOPLE MGMT., May 2, 1996, at 22,22 (identifying AT&T as a company that
"made large numbers of staff redundant despite record profits"); Uchitelle & Kleinfield, supra
note 15 (naming prosperous companies that downsized); Allan Sloan, TheHitMen, NEWSWEEK,
Feb. 26, 1996, at 44, 44 ("Something is just plain wrong when stock prices keep rising on Wall
Street while Main Street is littered with the bodies of workers discarded by big companies like
AT&T and Chase Manhattan and Scott Paper.").
17. See FRASER, supra note 16, at 216 (stating that RIF sounds "nothing if notjazzy and
upbeat"); Gary Minda, OpportunisticDownsizing ofAging Workers: The 1990s Version ofAge
and Pension Discrimination in Employment, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 511, 511 nn.l-2 (1997)
[hereinafter Minda, Opportunistic Downsizing] (describing "downsized" as a corporate
euphemism for harsher words like "fired" and "dismissed" and observing that "RIF has a
euphemistic quality similar to downsizing").
18. Gary Minda, Aging Workers in the PostindustrialEra, 26 STETSON L. REv. 561,574
(1996) [hereinafter Minda, Aging Workers].
19. See infra notes 192-94 and accompanying text.
20. ALAN DOWNS, CORPORATE EXECUTIONS: THE UGLY TRUTH ABOUT LAYOFFS-How
CORPORATE GREED IS SHATTERING LIVES, COMPANIES, AND COMMUNITIES 39 (1995).

21. See infra Part II.A.
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II.BACKGROUND

A. LegalBackground
Others have covered the history of the ADEA, in depth and the structure
of claims under it,' but the brief overview that follows will put the discussion
in context.
1. History ofSalary-BasedTerminations Under the ADEA
When the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed, Congress did not include
age discrimination provisions, but instead directed the Secretary of Labor to
conduct a study of issues affecting older workers. 24 Secretary Wirtz's report,
filed the next year, identified grave problems facing older workers due to
employment discrimination.25 The ADEA was enacted in 1967 "hard on the
heels of the [ Wirtz Report]. 26
In enacting the ADEA, Congress found that "older workers find
themselves disadvantaged in their efforts to retain employment, and especially
to regain employment when displaced from jobs."27 Among the Act's
provisions was a proscription on limiting employees "in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's age."' s The Act's exceptions include situations where age is a
"bona fide occupational qualification" or where the challenged decision is
'
based on "reasonable factors other than age."29
Since the enactment of the ADEA, various economically-based decisions
have been challenged under it, including employers' failure to hire more

22. See 1 HOWARD C. EGLrr, AGE DiSCRIMINATION §§ 2.01-2.02 (2d ed., West 2000);
Roberta Sue Alexander, Comment, The Future of Disparate Impact Analysis for Age
Discriminationin a Post-Hazen Paper World, 25 U. DAYTON L. REV.75, 78-81 (1999).
23. See 2 HoWARD C. EGLIT, AGE DISCRIMINATIONpassim (2d ed., West 2000); 1 MARK

A. ROTHSTEIN ETAL., EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.37 (2d ed. 1999); Jeff Morneau, Too Good, Too
Bad: "Overqualified" Older Workers, 22 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 45, 52-61 (2000); Don R.
Sampen, Age Discriminationand ReasonableNon-Age Factors,24 J.C. & U.L. 1, 9-17 (1997).
24. See Michael C. Harper, ADEA DoctrinalImpediments to the Fulfillment of the Wirtz
Report Agenda, 31 U. RICH. L. REv. 757, 758 (1997).
25. WIRTZ REPORT, supranote 2, at 19-33.
26. See Mullin v. Raytheon Co., 164 F.3d 696, 703 (lst Cir.), cert. denied,528 U.S. 811
(1999).
27. 29 U.S.C. § 621(a)(1) (1994).
28. Id. § 623(a)(2).
29. Id. § 623(0(1).
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experienced teachers in order to save money, 30 denial of employee pension
rights,3 and demotions of older workers to save salary costs.32
Salary-based terminations of older workers have generated numerous
lawsuits.3 3 A prominent case representative of the trend during the first twentyfive years was Metz v. TransitMix, Inc.where a fifty-four-year-old longtime
employee was fired.34 Due to annual raises throughout his twenty-seven years
of employment with the company, Metz was among its highest-paid
employees, and he alleged that he was fired because of his high salary. 35 The
trial court found for the defendant.36 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit found
Metz's plight to be "one of the very problems the ADEA was intended to
address: the likelihood that the employee will be less employable in other

30. See EEOC v. Atlantic Cmty. Sch. Dist., 879 F.2d 434,435-36 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding
that hiring less-experienced, younger teacher to avoid paying higher wage did not violate the
ADEA).
31. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 612 (1993) (holding that terminating
an older worker to avoid vesting of his pension did not violate the ADEA); Abbott v. Fed. Forge,
Inc., 912 F.2d 867, 877-78 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that refusing to re-hire older workers to
avoid paying pension benefits did not violate the ADEA).
32. See Mullin v. Raytheon Co., 164 F.3d 696, 699 (Ist Cir. 1999) (holding that demotion
to save salary costs did not violate the ADEA).
33. Federal cases where courts held that salary-based terminations did, or might, violate
the ADEA include Jardien v. Winston Network, Inc., 888 F.2d 1151, 1157-58 (7th Cir. 1989);
Uffelman v. Lone Star Steel Co., 863 F.2d 404, 408 (5th Cir. 1989); Metz v. TransitMix, Inc.,
828 F.2d 1202, 1211 (7th Cir. 1987); Graefenhain v. PabstBrewing Co., 827 F.2d 13,21 (7th
Cir. 1987); Leftwich v.Harris-StoweState Coll., 702 F.2d 686, 691 (8th Cir. 1983); Quercia v.
AllmericaFin., 84 F. Supp. 2d 222, 227-28 (D. Mass. 2000); Camachov. SearsRoebuckdeP.R.,
939 F. Supp. 113, 118 (D.P.R. 1996); Gelofv. Papineau,648 F. Supp. 912,927 (D. Del. 1986),
vacated in part on other grounds, 829 F.2d 452 (3d Cir. 1987); Franciv. Avco Corp., 538 F.
Supp. 250, 259 (D. Conn. 1982); Marshall v. Arlene Knitwear, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 715, 730
(E.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd in part,rev'd in part,608 F.2d 1369 (2d Cir. 1979).
Federal cases where courts held that salary-based terminations did not, or would not,violate
the ADEA include EEOCv. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 191 F.3d 948, 951-53 (8th Cir. 1999);
Snow v. Ridgeview Med. Ctr., 128 F.3d 1201, 1208 (8th Cir. 1997); Lewis v. Aerospace Cmty.
Credit Union, 114 F.3d 745,749 & n.4, 750 (8th Cir. 1997); Hanebrinkv. Brown Shoe Co., 110
F.3d 644, 647 (8th Cir. 1997); Slathar v. Sather Trucking Corp., 78 F.3d 415, 419 (8th Cir.
1996); Bialasv. GreyhoundLines,Inc., 59 F.3d 759, 763 (8th Cir. 1995); Serben v. Inter-City
Mfg. Co., 36 F.3d 765, 766 (8th Cir. 1994); Allen v. Diebold,Inc., 33 F.3d 674, 679 (6th Cir.
1994); Anderson v. Baxter HealthcareCorp, 13 F.3d 1120, 1126 (7th Cir. 1994); Hamilton v.
GrocersSupply Co., 986 F.2d 97,99 (5th Cir. 1993); EEOCv. ClayPrintingCo., 955 F.2d 936,
941-43 (4th Cir. 1992); Wfheeldon v. Monon Corp., 946 F.2d 533, 536 (7th Cir. 1991); Bay v.
Times MirrorMagazines, Inc., 936 F.2d 112, 117 (2d Cir. 1991); Wado v. Xerox Corp., 991 F.
Supp. 174, 214 (W.D.N.Y. 1998), aff'd sub nom. Smith v. Xerox Corp., 196 F.3d 358 (2d Cir.
1999); Sperlingv. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1396,1410-11 (D.N.J. 1996); Kraemer
v. Franklin& MarshallColl., 909 F. Supp. 268,271 (E.D. Pa. 1995); Wilson v. Popp Yarn Corp.,
680 F. Supp. 208, 212-13 (W.D.N.C. 1988); Mastie v. GreatLakes Steel Corp., 424 F. Supp.
1299, 1319 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
34. Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc., 828 F.2d 1202, 1203 (7th Cir. 1987).
35. Id.
36. Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 286, 294 (N.D. Ind. 1986) (stating that the
ADEA was intended to cover older workers only as a group).
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settings."37 It also concluded that the ADEA was meant to protect individuals
like Metz, not just groups. 3 Determining that Metz's salary was a proxy for
age,39 the court reversed and remanded the case.' Acknowledging that
employers must be able to control costs, the court emphasized that it would be
"unwise" to convert that principle into a rule that allows salary-based
terminations of older workers when less burdensome alternatives, such as pay
cuts, are available' The court said that such a rule would make employees
with long service and higher pay "totally vulnerable. 42
Judge Easterbrook delivered a strong dissent supportedby legal,43 policy, 4
and economic45 arguments. Of particular interest here is his statement that the
Act's business necessity justification should exonerate the defendant: "It is
hard to imagine how the use of wages could not be valid; wages correspond
precisely to the costs of doing business, and hence to profitability."'
In the 1990s, courts began to shift away from the majority view in Metz.
In 1990, the Sixth Circuit held that a company's decision to save pension costs
by not recalling laid-off older employees was economic and therefore
acceptable because it was based on a factor other than age.4 7 Soon afterward,
Judge Posner wrote an opinion holding that an employee allegedly terminated,
in part, to save pension costs could not recover under the ADEA. s Then two
salary-based termination cases were decided for the defendants.4 9 Although
both cases were decided on lack of sufficient evidence to support the claims,
in Bay v. Times MirrorMagazines,Inc., the Second Circuit made the broader
policy comment that "there is nothing in the ADEA that prohibits an employer
from making employment decisions that relate an employee's salary to
contemporaneous market conditions and ... concluding that a particular
employee's salary is too high." 50

37. Metz, 828 F.2d at 1205.
38. Id. at 1206.
39. Id. at 1208-09.
40. Id. at 1211.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1209.
43. Metz, 828 F.2d at 1214-16 (Easterbrook, J.,
dissenting).
44. Id. at 1212-14, 1216-21.
45. Id. at 1220-21.
46. Id. at 1219.
47. Abbott v. Fed. Forge, Inc., 912 F.2d 867, 871-72, 875-77 (6th Cir. 1990). The court
was able to distinguish prior case law on economic decisions because some union issues were
involved. Id. at 876.
48. Visser v. Packer Eng'g Assocs., Inc., 924 F.2d 655, 656-60 (7th Cir. 1991). The claim
failed for lack of evidence that either age or pension status was a factor in the termination. Id.
at 658. Interestingly, the dissenting judges laid out what they saw as sufficient evidence to
establish a prima facie case. Id. at 662-63 (Flaum, Bauer, and Cudahy, JJ.,
dissenting).
49. EEOC v. Clay Printing Co., 955 F.2d 936, 946 (4th Cir. 1992) (finding insufficient
evidence to support the claim); Bay v. Times Mirror Magazines, Inc., 936 F.2d 112,118 (2d Cir.
1991) (finding insufficient evidence to support the claim).
50. Bay, 936 F.2d at 117.
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In 1993, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Hazen PaperCo. v. Biggins, a
key age discrimination case that examined economically-motivated employer
conduct.-' Hazen Paper concerned a sixty-two-year-old employee who was
terminated a few weeks before his pension was to vest.12 He alleged that the
company had violated the ADEA by firing him to avoid vesting of his
pension. 3The Court phrased its holding in carefully restricted language: "[A]n
employer does not violate the ADEA just by interfering with an older
employee's pension benefits that would have vested by virtue of the
employee's years of service."5 4 Elsewhere in its opinion, the Court stated that
a decision "wholly motivated by factors other than age" does not violate the
ADEA, even if the factor in question correlates with age. 5 The Court did
comment thatbecause the employee's claim concerned pension rights, he could
bring a claim under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
and thus was not completely without a remedy.56That alternative does not exist
in the ordinary salary-based termination case.
After Hazen Paper,courts began applying its language to hold that salarybased terminations did not violate the ADEA. For example, the Seventh Circuit
denied a claim on the basis that salary could not be equated with age,57 and the
Second Circuit held that the ADEA does not prohibit "decisions that relate an
employee's salary to contemporaneous market conditions.""8 Similarly, a
California appellate court interpreting the ADEA denied a claim with the
comment that "all businesses... have a legitimate interest in saving money." 59
A few courts questioned salary-based terminations, 6° but the legal climate was
increasingly becoming one where "age discrimination law is largely ineffectual
in protecting older workers.'

51. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 608-14 (1993).
52. Id. at 607. The Court left open whether the result would be different where pension
vesting was tied not to years of service but to age. Id. at 613.
53. Id. at 607.
54. Id. at 613.
55. Id. at 611.
56. Id. at 612. ERISA is found at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994).
57. Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1125-26 (7th Cir. 1994).
58. Bay v. Times Mirror Magazines, 936 F.2d 112, 117 (2d Cir. 1991); see alsosupranote
33 for cases denying ADEA claims for salary-based terminations of older workers. But see
Minda, OpportunisticDownsizing,supranote 17, at 538 (arguing that it is still debatable whether
the ADEA permits the use of salary as a proxy for age).
59. Marks v. Loral Corp., 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 21 (Ct. App. 1997). Marks was called into
doubt by statute. See infra notes 292-93 and accompanying text.
60. E.g., Quercia v. Allmerica Fin., 84 F. Supp. 2d 222,227-28 (D. Mass. 2000); Camacho
v. Sears Roebuck de P.R., 939 F. Supp. 113, 118 (D.P.R. 1996). In each of these salary-based
termination cases, the employer's motion for summary judgment was denied.
61. Minda, Aging Workers, supranote 18, at 580-81; see also Harper, supranote 24, at 779
(stating that the goals of the Wirtz Report cannot be reached while employers can justify
terminating older workers by citing older workers' higher costs); Jan W. Henkel, The Age
Discrimination in Employment Act: Disparate Impact Analysis and the Availability of
LiquidatedDamagesAfterHazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 47 SYRAcuSEL.REV. 1183, 1184(1997)
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2. Frameworksfor ADEA Claims
There are two conceptual frameworks for ADEA suits: disparate treatment
and disparate impact, which parallel the bases for Title V11 62 discrimination
claims.63 Case law, currently in some dispute on important issues, does not
present a clear framework for analyzing economically-based decisions under
the ADEA. 4 Salary-based termination claims have been brought under both
disparate treatment and disparate impact theories."
A disparate treatment claim is the most straightforward: it alleges that an
employer has intentionally treated an older employee or employees differently
because of age.66 Under this approach, the plaintiff may offer direct or
circumstantial proof of age discrimination.(7 Direct proof takes the form of a
direct statement by the employer-the smoking gun or open comment about

(asserting that current case law has "greatly limited the ability of plaintiffs to successfully
challenge discriminatory practices"); Kester Spindler, Comment, ShareholderDemands for
Higher CorporateEarningsHave Their Price: How Courts Allow Employers to Fire Older
Employees for TheirAchievements, 27 PEPP. L. REv. 807, 808 (2000) (describing the argument
that allowing salary-based discrimination "in effect extinguishes the protections of the ADEA
because employers could easily circumvent" the Act); Brendan Sweeney, Comment,
"Downsizing"theAgeDiscriminationinEmploymentAct: TheAvailabilityofDisparatelmpact
Liability,41 VILL. L. REv. 1527, 1575 (1996) (concluding that recent decisions have "seriously
limited" the protections for older workers under the ADEA).
62. Title VII is found at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994) and covers discrimination based on
an individual's race, color, gender, religion, or national origin.
63. See, e.g., Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,335 (1977) (analyzing
a Title VII claim under a disparate treatment framework); Camacho, 939 F. Supp. at 116-18
(analyzing an ADEA claim under a disparate treatment framework). The genesis and purposes
of the two acts have often been viewed as similar. See Marshall v. Arlene Knitwear, Inc., 454
F. Supp. 715, 728 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (stating that "[a]ge discrimination, while often more subtle
than race or sex discrimination, is equally pernicious"). But see Samuel Issacharoff & Erica
Worth Harris, Is Age Discrimination Really Age Discrimination?: The ADEA's Unnatural
Solution, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 780, 781-82 (1997) (arguing that the antidiscrimination model
should not be applied to the problems of older workers).
64. See I ROTHSTEiN, supra note 23, § 2.37, at 330-31.
65. See IEGLrr,supranote 22, § 4.19, at 4-75 to 4-76; 2 EGLIT, supranote 23, §§ 7.52-53,
at315-31 (1997 &Supp. 2001). Butsee Stacey Crawshaw-Lewis, Comment, "Overpaid"Older
Workers andtheAge DiscriminationinEmploymentAct, 71 WASH.L.REV. 769,783 & n.96, 784
& n.97 (1996) (finding that although a few cases have been brought under disparate impact and
disparate treatment analysis, most cases presented disparate treatment claims). Cases applying
both disparate impact and disparate treatment analysis include: Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d
1027, 1032-35 (2d Cir. 1980); Camacho, 939 F. Supp. at 116-23; Franciv. Avco Corp., 538 F.
Supp. 250,255-61 (D. Conn. 1982).
66. Camacho, 939 F. Supp. at 116. See also Int'lBhd. of Teamsters,431 U.S. at 335 n.15
(defining a disparate treatment claim).
67. Rose v. Wells Fargo & Co., 902 F.2d 1417, 1421 (9th Cir. 1990). The analytical
framework applied to disparate treatment claims has varied in reduction-in-force cases. See
Jessica Lind, Note, The PrimaFacie Case ofAge Discriminationin Reduction-in-ForceCases,
94 MifcH. L. REv. 832, 833-34 (1995).
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age that proves violation of the ADEA without inference or presumption. s
Alternatively, the plaintiff may offer statistical evidence to prove the
employer's intent to discriminate. 69
An obstacle to a disparate treatment claim for a salary-based termination
is the need to show intentional discrimination because of age. The worker will
ordinarily not be able to show the employer's intent unless salary is viewed as
the essential equivalent of age. The proxy theory provides a framework for
doing this.7" The broadest conception of this theory would allow a factor that
is correlated with age to stand in for age.7' Thus in Metz, a higher salary
achieved through years of service was held to be the statutory equivalent of age
that supported a disparate treatment claim.72 The narrower conception would
apply the proxy theory only where the factor masks actual reliance on
age-that is, where "the employer may suppose a correlation between the two
factors and act accordingly."'73 The Court in Hazen Paperwrote disapprovingly
of the "statutory equivalent" approach and stated that while there may be some
correlation between salary and age, the correlation is too imperfect for one
factor to be a proxy for the other.74 However, the Court did "not preclude" the
possibility that an employer could violate the ADEA under the second,
narrower use of the proxy doctrine.75 After Hazen Paper,the proxy theory's

68. See Earley v. Champion Int'l Corp., 907 F.2d 1077, 1081 (1lth Cir. 1990) (quoting the
hypothetical statement "Fire Earley-he is too old" as an example of direct evidence).
69. See Culley v. Trak Microwave Corp., 117 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1319-20 (M.D. Fla. 2000)
(holding that statistics showing that a higher percentage of older workers rather than younger
workers were laid off did not establish the plaintiff's claim where no statistics were offered to
show the percentage of older workers among the employees in general).
70. See Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc., 828 F.2d 1202, 1207-08 (7th Cir. 1987).
71. See White v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 862 F.2d 56, 62 (3d Cir. 1988) (applying the
proxy theory because pension status and age are "inextricably linked"); Metz, 828 F.2d at 1208
(using high salary as a proxy for age because the salary was a direct result ofthe plaintiff's many
years of employment); Coates v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 433 F. Supp. 655, 661 (W.D. Va.
1977) (equating training level with age because of the direct relationship between the two).
Professor Gary Minda has argued that this theory should apply to the salary-based termination
cases. Minda, OpportunisticDownsizing,supra note 17, at 568.
72. Met-, 828 F.2d at 1207-08. Also see Hazen PaperCo. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 613
(1993), where the Court interpreted Metz as using "proxy" to mean statutory equivalence.
73. Hazen Paper,507 U.S. at 613.
74. Id. at 611-13. Judge Easterbrook's dissent in Metz was an early judicial expression of
this point. Metz, 828 F.2d at 1217-18 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (presenting statistics that
contradicted the correlation between salary and age). But see Toni J. Querry, Note, A Rose by
Any OtherName No Longer Smells As Sweet: DisparateTreatment Discriminationand the Age
Proxy Doctrine After Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 530, 580 (1996)
(concluding that the Court's narrowing of the age proxy doctrine "permits employers to evade
the ADEA by implementing employment decisions based on seemingly non-age criteria that
correlate highly with age").
75. Hazen Paper,507 U.S. at 613; see also Robert J. Gregory, There Is Life in That Old
(I Mean, More "Senior")Dog Yet: The Age-Proxy Theory After Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins,
11 HOFsTRA LAB. L.J. 391, 426-27 (1994) (arguing for the more limited application of the age
proxy theory).
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application to salary-based claims is in question as courts have become
reluctant to recognize salary as a proxy for age." 6
It is now well acknowledged that as employers become more aware ofthe
threat of discrimination claims, a plaintiffhas little likelihood of finding direct
proof of a violation.77 For this reason, the Supreme Court, in the Title VII case
McDonnellDouglas Corp. v. Green, established a burden-shifting method of
proving disparate treatment.78 This method puts on the employer some of the
burden concerning the facts to which it has unique access,79 and it has been
extended to cover ADEA claims.8°
The second framework for discrimination claims, the disparate impact
approach, was first recognized by the Supreme Court in Griggsv. Duke Power
Co., a race discrimination case.8 This framework allows a claim to be made
without proof of intent."2 To prove disparate impact, a plaintiff must show that
a specific or identifiable employment practice or policy caused a disparate
impact on a protected group. 3 The burden then shifts to the defendant to justify
the challenged practice by showing that it serves a "legitimate employment
goal[]."4

76. See. e.g., Slathar v. Sather Trucking Corp., 78 F.3d 415, 418-19 (8th Cir. 1996)
(finding that even if the employee was firedbecause ofsalary or experience, "age discrimination
cannot necessarily be inferred"); Lyon v. Ohio Educ. Ass'n &Prof'1 Staff Union, 53 F.3d 135,
139 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that an economic reason that correlated with age was not an age
proxy absent evidence that age itself was the employer's real motivation).
77. See, e.g., Holzman v. Jaymar-Ruby, Inc., 916 F.2d 1298, 1303 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating
that typically in age discrimination cases, there is no "smoking gun"); Minda, Opportunistic
Downsizing,supra note 17, at 538-39 (reasoning that "smoking gun" evidence is rare because
employers "have become more sophisticated in insulating their actions from ADEA attack").
78. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973).
79. Id. at 804-05.
80. See Hazen Paper,507 U.S. at 612; Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120,
1122 (7th Cir. 1994). In ordinary cases, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case by
showing that "(1) [he or] she was a member of the protected class (age 40 or over), (2) [he or]
she was doing the job well enough to meet [the] employer's legitimate expectations, (3) [he or]
she was discharged or demoted, and (4)
the employer sought a replacement." Anderson, 13 F.3d
at 1122. If the prima facie case is established, then the burden shifts to the employer to articulate
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge. Id. If the employer is successful, the
presumption dissolves and the burden shifts back to the employee. Id.
Several courts have modified this framework for use in RIF cases. See, e.g., Williams v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 120, 129 (5th Cir. Unit B Sept. 1981) (replacing the second and
fourth factors above with requirements that the worker show that he or she was qualified to
assume another position at the time of the discharge or demotion and the worker produce
evidence that the employer intended to discriminate).
81. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,431-32 (1971).
82. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977); Camacho v.
Sears Roebuck de P.R., 939 F. Supp. 113, 118 (D.P.R. 1996).
83. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 657 (1989).
84. Id. at 658-59. The exact nature of the burden, whether of persuasion or merely
production, is unclear. Id. at 660 (interpreting case law as establishing burden of production).
After Wards Cove Packing Co., Congress amended Title VII to re-establish that the defendant
has the burden of persuasion on this issue. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105
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For years after Griggs, courts assumed that the disparate impact analysis
would apply to ADEA claims as well as Title VII claims because of the similar
genesis and wording of the two acts."5 Today, whether disparate impact can be
applied at all in age discrimination cases is the subject of vigorous debate,86
particularly after three concurring Justices in the Hazen Papercase said there
are "substantial arguments" that it should not. 7 They contended that the ADEA
was meant to cover only cases based on the intentional conduct covered by the
disparate treatment scheme.8" Like the age-proxy theory, the disparate impact
89 partly due to the
approach has been increasingly limited after Hazen Paper,
concurring Justices' language. Courts have freely allowed the business
justification defense, emphasizing that an economically-based practice need not
be based on an essential need to be justified under the Act.90 This construction

Stat. 852 (1991) (codified at42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A) (1994)). However, Congress did not
amend the ADEA at the same time, leaving some question as to what standard applies under it.
See Smith v. City of Des Moines, 99 F.3d 1466, 1471 (8th Cir. 1996) (applying the pre-Wards
Cove business necessity standard, which places the burden ofpersuasion on the defendant, to the
ADEA); Brett Ira Johnson, Note, Six of One, Half-Dozen ofAnother: Mullin v. Raytheon Co.
as a RepresentativeofFederalCircuit Courts ErroneouslyDistinguishingthe ADEAfrom Title
VIIRegarding DisparateImpact Liability, 36 IDAHO L. REv. 303,307 n.18 (2000) (recognizing
that although it may be an open question whether the Title VII amendments apply to the ADEA,
the ultimate result is that the pre-Wards Cove standard applies).
85. See, e.g., Mullin v. Raytheon Co., 164 F.3d 696, 700 (1st Cir. 1999) (citing pre-1993
cases applying disparate impact to ADEA claims).
86. See, e.g., id. at 700-01, 706 (discussing cases for and against the application of
disparate impact under the ADEA and holding that the theory is not applicable); Coleman v.
Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1291 & n.6 (9th Cir. 2000) (assuming that disparate impact
remains viable but citing contrary cases from other circuits), cert. deniedsub nom., Gentile v.
Quaker Oats Co., 121 S. Ct. 2592 (2001).
See generallyJenniferJ.Clemons & Richard A. Bales,ADEA DisparateImpact in the Sixth
Circuit, 27 OHIo N.U. L. REV. 1, 28 (2000) (arguing that without the availability of disparate
impact in ADEA claims some plaintiffs will be left "virtually unprotected," and urging Congress
to codify the approach under the ADEA); Henkel, supra note 61, at 1185 (defending "the use of
disparate impact under the ADEA"); Douglas C. Herbert & Lani Schweiker Shelton, A
PragmaticArgument Against Applying the DisparateImpact Doctrine in Age Discrimination
Cases, 37 S. TnX. L. REV. 625, 660 (1996) (arguing that the doctrine should not be available
under the ADEA because complex issues involved in disparate impact could not be resolved by
layjuries); Issacharoff& Harris, supranote 63, at 835-36 (arguing that disparate impact analysis
should not apply to salary reductions among older workers); Steven J. Kaminshine, The Cost of
Older Workers, DisparateImpact, and the Age Discriminationin Employment Act, 42 FLA. L.
REv. 229, 272-78 (1990) (analyzing the majority and minority approaches to the application of
disparate impact); Sweeney, supranote 61, at 1575-76 (arguing that Hazen Paper'slimitation
on disparate impact analysis "seriously limited" the scope of ADEA protection).
87. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604,618 (1993) (Kennedy and Thomas, JJ., and
Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
88. Id. at 617-18.
89. See Alexander, supra note 22, at 86 & nn.79-84.
90. See, e.g., Michas v. Health Cost Controls of Ill., Inc., 209 F.3d 687, 694-95 (7th Cir.
2000) (affirming summary judgment for the defendant when plaintiff failed to prove defendant's
business justification was a pretext).
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seems to bypass the "reasonable" language in the Act's "reasonable factors
other than age" defense,91 a significant omission that is discussed below.92
B. The Human Capital Theory
In addition to legal background, an understanding of the salary-based
termination cases requires an overview of the human capital theory. That theory
holds that while a company invests in training a younger worker, he may be
paid less than he can actually produce, but in his later years he may be paid
more than he produces, resulting in the worker receiving his due over the
lifetime of his employment. 93 From the employer's perspective, the reason for
the increasing pay over the years is to "discourage employee shirking and
malfeasance," which may be difficult to detect but will be punished, if
discovered, by terminating the worker before the later, highly paid years play
out.94 Under this theory, it is unfair for a company to terminate a worker
without cause just when he is receiving his expected higher pay in his later
working years. Such terminations are called "opportunistic," because to
accomplish them the employer must breach an implicit agreement with the
worker.95
The human capital theory recognizes the justice of paying an older worker
his due, but at the same time the theory may encourage executives to think of
workers "like a used-up piece of machinery" to be thrown out at will.96
Companies have an economic motive to opportunistically terminate the worker
who has achieved a higher salary, whether through years ofwork with the same

91. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(1) (1994).
92. See infra notes 265-73 and accompanying text.
93. See Robert M. Hutchens, Seniority, Wages and Productivity A Turbulent Decade, 3
J.EcoN.PERSp. 49,50-52 (1989). For discussions ofhow the human capital theory applies to age
discrimination see Harper, supra note 24, at 780-83; Minda, OpportunisticDownsizing,supra
note 17, at 523-25.
A related theory, the life-cycle theory, holds that employees enter into delayed payment
arrangements, in which part of their compensation is withheld until the last years of their work
cycle. See Edward P. Lazear, WhyIs ThereMandatoryRetirement?, 87J. POL. ECON. 1261,1264
(1979) (explaining the advantages forboth workers and employers to agree to a wage stream that
starts out paying workers less than their productivity would justify in their early years, but more
than it would justify in their later years). See also Issacharoff & Harris, supranote 63, at 788
n.33 (citing numerous authorities supporting Lazear's life-cycle theory); Stewart J. Schwab, LifeCycle Justice: AccommodatingJust Causeand Employment At Will, 92 MICH. L. REV. 8,43-47
(1993) (applying the life-cycle theory to explain seemingly contradictory results in employment
cases).
94. See Hutchens, supra note 93, at 55; Schwab, supra note 93, at 10. See generally
Sherwin Rosen, Transaction Costs andInternalLaborMarkets,4 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 49 (1988)
(discussing the affects of the competitive price mechanism on the labor market).
95. See Minda, OpportunisticDownsizing, supranote 17, at 512; Schwab, supranote 93,
at 20-21.
96. See Minda, OpportunisticDownsizing,supra note 17, at 559.
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employer 7 or in the work force generally,98 although doing so avoids a
"realistic assessment" of the true value of those workers, which includes their
acquired finm-specific skills.'
III. ALLOWING SALARY-BASED TERMINATIONS
ESTABLISHES BAD PUBLIC POLICY
A.

OF OLDER WORKERS

The Meaning ofPublic Policy

The meaning of "public policy" is difficult to pin down precisely,"°° but
Black's Law Dictionaryprovides a workable definition: "[T]hat general and
well-settled public opinion relating to man's plain, palpable duty to his
fellowmen, having due regard to all circumstances of each particular relation

and situation."''

Sources of public policy are constitutions, statutes, and

judicial decisions. 2 The court-made rules allowing economically-based
terminations of older workers thus create a public policy. It is one that harms
the affected older workers, the surviving workers, the companies they work for,
and society in general; it stands counter to our best cultural values. Moreover,
it is not even based on well-settled public opinion. A widely distributed survey
has shown that only forty percent of U.S. middle managers agree that a
company's real goal is profit and does not involve considering other corporate
stakeholders like employees.103

97. See Minda, Aging Workers, supra note 18, at 576-77. Minda pointed out that thirty
years ago unions would have stepped in to curtail these opportunistic firings, but that unions
have now lost much of their power. Id. at 577-78.
98. See Jardien v. Winston Network, Inc., 888 F.2d 1151, 1157-58 (7th Cir. 1989)
(allowing a discharged employee to recover because of a positive correlation between salary and
age, even though the employee's higher salary was due to experience gained elsewhere in the
industry); Harper, supranote 24, at 788 (suggesting that the delayed payment agreement should
apply even for mobile workers, "regardless of which employer in an industry takes advantage
of [the worker's] experience"); Christine Jolls, Hands-Tying and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 74 TEx. L. REv. 1813, 1815 (1996) (arguing that worker mobility necessitates
the ADEA to enforce employers' implicit agreements to pay older workers more).
99. Minda, OpportunisticDownsizing,supra note 17, at 549-50.
100. See Black Indus., Inc. v. Bush, 110 F. Supp. 801, 804 (D.N.J. 1953) (stating that the
term "public policy" is vague); McKendree v. S. States Life Ins. Co. of Ala., 112 S.C. 335, 338,
99 S.E. 806, 807 (1919) (referring to public policy as a "wide domain of shifting sands").
101. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1231 (6th ed. 1990) (citing Hammands v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 796 (N.D. Ohio 1965)); see also Sabich v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger
Corp., 763 F. Supp. 989, 994 (N.D. 111.1991) (stating that "'public policy concerns what is right
and just and what affects the citizens of the State collectively."' (quoting Palmateer v. Int'l
Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (11. 1981))).
102. See Hoover v. Radabaugh, 123 F. Supp. 2d 412,426 (S.D. Ohio 2000); Sabich, 763
F. Supp. at 994; Palmateer,421 N.E.2d at 878.
103. See Thomas W. Dunfee, CorporateGovernance in a Market With Morality, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1999, at 129, 143-44 (citing a survey of 15,000 middle managers in
seven countries reported in CHARLES HAMPDEN-TURNER & ALFRONS TROMPENAARS, THE SEVEN
CULTURES OF CAPITALISM 32 (1993)).
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B. The Impact of Salary-Based Terminations on Discharged Older
Workers
You can 'teat the orangeandthrow the peel away-a man is
not apiece offi-uit!
-Willy Loman' °
Arthur Miller created Willy Loman more than fifty years ago, but Willy's
words on being fired are especially applicable today. As management
consultant Alan Downs wrote in 1995, "Employees,. once seen as assets to be
cultivated and protected, now are more like disposable units to be used, then
discarded at will."' ' An EEOC lawyer observed that businesses see workers
like "physical capital and land."'" In the language of a computer expert,
workers are treated like "bits and bytes.""0 7 Columbia anthropology professor
Katherine Newman put it simply: today many companies see workers "as
disposable as Kleenex."10 8
However it is phrased, being disposable has profound effects, which the
salary-based termination cases vividly illustrate. For example, Aida Camacho,
forty-seven years old when she lost her job, was unable to find new work by
the time of the trial in 1996, lost her longtime companion, and developed
alcoholism.0 9 George Coates, a field engineer acknowledged to be a "good
employee[]," lost his job in a reduction in force at the age of fifty."0 The court
found that his termination had "serious effects," both social and economic, on
him and his wife."' Coates' co-plaintifffbecame unresponsive to his family, and
his wife was forced to miss her mother's funeral for lack of money."' The
downsized plaintiffs in another case were described as suffering "emotional
distress, depression, increased drug use, decrease in feelings of a useful life, a
contracted social life, increased cigarette consumption, lassitude, sexual
problems, and a reduced sense of well-being."" 3
The widespread and similarly profound effects on other discharged
workers are well documented. Research for the Wirtz Report identified the
"psychological shock" to terminated older workers, which was often

104. Arthur Miller, DeathofSalesman (1949), reprintedin 3A TREASURY OF THE THEATRE
1063, 1083 (John Gassner ed., rev. ed. 1963). These lines were also quoted in Metz v. Transit
Mix, Inc., 828 F.2d 1202, 1205 n.6. (7th Cir. 1987).
105. DoNs, supranote 20, at 30-31.
106. Marc Rosenblum, The Prerogativeto Downsize-A Commentary on Blumrosen, et aL,
2 EMPLOYEE RTs. & Emp.POL'YJ. 417,417(1998).

107. Mumford &Hendricks, supra note 16, at 25.
108. KATHERiNE S. NEWMAN, FALLING FROM GRACE: DoWNWARD MOBILITY INTHE AGE

OF AFFLUENCE 239 (U. of Cal. Press 1999) (1988).
109. Camacho v. Sears Roebuck de P.R., 939 F. Supp. 113, 116 (D.P.R. 1996).
110. Coates v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 433 F. Supp. 655, 658 (W.D. Va. 1977).
111. Id. at 659.
112. Id.
113. EEOC v. Chrysler Corp., 733 F.2d 1183, 1186 (6th Cir. 1984).
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manifested as "resentment, bewilderment or what might be called
bereavement."' 14 Older workers, who bear a "disproportionate burden of the
current era of restructuring,""' experience "serious distress when job loss
interrupts their
expected pattern" of working until the normal retirement age of
6
sixty-five."
Job loss may make the difference between financial stability and long-term
financial hardship for older workers who often have children in college and
planned to save for their retirement in their later working years." 7 Their
pension accumulation is interrupted,"8 they lose social security credits," 9 and
they must dip into savings. 20 Even the taken-for-granted ability to buy birthday
presents, visit friends, or use the telephone may be threatened.' Women may
be particularly hard hit, suffering greater earnings loss and being more likely
to end their lives in poverty."
The financial losses may continue for years.' Indeed, financial journalist
Jill Andresky Fraser reported that "[m]any families never recover from the
financial hit of a job loss." '24 Her analysis of Department of Labor statistics
showed that half of displaced workers are unable to find new work promptly.'"
Fraser further explained that finding work is more difficult for those over

114. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER: AGE DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR TO THE CONGRESS UNDER SECTION 715 OF

THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, RESEARCH MATERIALS 102 (1965) [hereinafter RESEARCH
MATERIALS].

115. Karen Nussbaum, SocialInsecurity: The Economic Marginalizationof Older Women
Workers, in THE AGING OF THE AMERICAN WORK FORCE 374, 375 (Irving Bluestone et al. eds.,
1990). See generally Sewin Chan & Ann Huff Stevens, The Effects of Job Loss on Older
Workers: Employment, Earnings,and Wealth, in ENSURING HEALTH AND INCOME SECURITYFOR
AN AGING WORKFORCE 189, 208 (Peter P. Budetti et al. eds., 200 1) (concluding that the impact
ofjob loss on an older worker's economic well-being is likely to be substantial).
116. Janice 0. Brewington &Sylvia Nassar-McMillan, OlderAdults: Work-Relatedlssues
and ImplicationsforCounseling, CAREERDEV. Q., Sept. 2000, at 2, 8.
117. In 1965, Secretary Wirtz's research showed that older workers faced "a higher risk
of unemployment at a time when earnings are crucial to meet heavy family expenses, to build
pension credits, and to save for future supplementation of retirement incomes." RESEARCH
MATERIALS, supra note 114, at 98.
118. See Chan & Stevens, supra note 115, at 206.
119. See DOWNS, supra note 20, at 65 (reporting that displaced workers often reach
retirement with "few or no benefits"); Steven H. Sandell & Stephen E. Baldwin, Older Workers
and Employment Shifts: Policy Responses to Displacement,in THE AGING OF THE AMERICAN
WORK FORCE, supra note 115, at 126, 132 (finding that displaced older workers may incur
hardship because they cannot add to Social Security credits and savings).
120. FRASER, supra note 16, at 54.
121. See SUE GLYPTIS, LEISURE AND UNEMPLOYMENT 73 (1989).

122. See Nusbaum, supra note 115, at 376-78.
123. See Sandell & Baldwin, supra note 119, at 133-36 (discussing the economic harm to
older workers who lose their jobs).
124. FRASER, supra note 16, at 54.

125. Id.; DOWNS, supra note 20, at 17-18; see also Chan & Stevens, supranote 115, at 200
(finding that earnings reductions associated with job loss are persistent).
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forty. 2 6 Ample data indicates that displaced older workers are likely to remain
unemployed longer than younger persons. 7 To compound the problem, just
28
being jobless puts an individual at a disadvantage in the job market.
Moreover, for experienced workers even past accomplishments may become
liabilities, causing prospective employers to shun them as "overqualified."'21
Earnings reductions are common; Professors Chan and Stevens found that older
workers who lost their jobs experienced a thirty-two percent reduction in
earnings that continued for several years.'3 Rutgers political science professor
Carl Van Horn reported that twenty-six percent of displaced workers find fulltime jobs, but earn less than before.'
All of this creates a heavy emotional toll. Professors Darity and Goldsmith
summarized the literature as showing that unemployment damages mental
health in many ways, "including depression, anxiety, low self-esteem and
strained personal relations.' 32 Professor Newman identified "[fleelings of
anger or dismay, a sense of injustice," as typical responses to downward
mobility.' The displaced workers also experience a sense of helplessness that
damages theirpsychological health.' Older workers in particular suffer greater
emotional distress when displaced than do younger workers. 35 This is partly
because, in addition to economic support, employment provides for "social

126. FRASER, supra note 16, at 54.
127. See Julie Ann McMullin & Victor W. Marshall, Ageism, Age Relations, and Garment
Industry Work in Montreal,41 GERONTOLIGIST 111, 112 (2001); John C. Rife &Richard J.First,
DiscouragedOlder Workers: An ExploratoryStudy, 29 INT'LJ.AGING &HuMANDEV., 195,196
(1989); Sandell & Baldwin, supra note 119, at 133.
128. See Note, Findinga Placefor the Jobless in DiscriminationTheory, 110 HARV. L.
REv. 1609,1609 (1997) (explaining that the unemployed experience "stigmatization, economic
and social invisibility, stereotyping, denial of authority, and exclusion from the job market").
129. See NEWMAN, supra note 108, at 66; Morneau, supra note 23, passim.
130. Chan & Stevens, supra note 115, at 200. Even after six years, percentages of lost
earnings remained close to that level. Id.
131. CARLE. VAN HORN, Economic Change and the American Worker, in No ONE LEFT
BEHIND: THE REPORTOFTHETWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASKFORCE ONRETRAININGAMERICA'S

WoRKFoRcE 55, 78 (1996); see alsoFRASER, supranote 16, at 55 (calculating from Department

of Labor statistics that about forty percent of displaced workers who do find jobs take pay cuts,
often of twenty percent or more).
132. William Darity, Jr. & Arthur H. Goldsmith, Social Psychology, Unemployment and
Macroeconomics, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 121, 122, 132 (1996). See also GLYPFnS, supranote 121,
at 77 (noting that the unemployed often feel inadequate, deviant, stigmatized, and even
ashamed); Peter Warr, Age, Work andMental Health, in IMPACr OF WORK ON OLDER ADULTS
252,260 (K. Warner Schaie & Carmi Schooler eds., 1998) (summarizing studies as consistently
showing that "people who are involuntarily unemployed tend to be psychologically harmed in
a range of ways").
133. NEWMAN, supra note 108, at 229. See also Brewington & Nassar-McMillan, supra
note 117, at 4 (discussing the relationship between job loss and psychological distress).
134. Arthur H. Goldsmith et al., The Psychological Impact of Unemployment and
Joblessness, 25 L Soclo-ECON. 333, 336 (1996); see also Warr, supra note 132, at 260
(summarizing studies showing psychological harm to the involuntarily unemployed).
135. Brewington & Nassar-McMillan, supranote 116, at 4 (compiling authorities about
the effect ofjoblessness on older workers).
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interaction, status, and a structure for one's time."' 36 Unemployed older
workers approach the normal age of retirement facing a very different
retirement life than they had planned on.'37 They may even declare themselves
retired, but do so to avoid the humiliating job search, although they continue
to suffer reduced economic conditions. 38 They face their retirement years in the
sort of economic difficulty that family and associates may see as "a 'final
grade' of professional failure." 139 Indeed, late-career job loss often "remains a
watershed that divides [people's] lives into a happy before and a tragic after
that stubbornly refuses to resolve into a life they can live with.""' These
profound effects on people's lives must be considered as society evaluates the
merit of allowing unrestricted economic justifications for terminating older
workers.
C. The Impact ofSalary-Based Terminationson Other Workers
The impact of an older worker's job loss extends beyond her own life.
Workers who remain at the company suffer adverse effects when they see
others laid off for purely economic reasons. University of Chicago economist
Sherwin Rosen explained that workers' attempts to climb higher on the
corporate ladder are strong inducements of their productivity.'

Today when

companies with "record profits" are laying off employees in an attempt to
become "lean and mean,"'42 termination of an older worker for salary reasons
suggests to younger workers that all their hard work and attendant raises will
simply make them prime candidates for termination. An employee who
survived downsizing at Chase Manhattan Corporation told a New York Times
reporter, "Every day there's that stock price staring at you. If it's too low,
managers say, 'Why let's get rid of some more people and watch it
rise'.

. .

. All they seem to care about is the bottom line."'43 The result,

Professor Barry Shore concluded, is that while one might expect surviving

136. See Carrie R. Leana & Daniel C. Feldman, FindingNew Jobs After a PlantClosing:
Antecedents and Outcomes ofthe OccurrenceandQuality ofReemployment, 48 HUM.REL. 1381,
1387 (1995).
137. See ROBERT D. MANNING,

CREDIT

CARD NATION 278 (2000).

138. See Sandell & Baldwin, supra note 119, at 136.
139. MANNING, supra note 137, at 276; see also Brewington & Nassar-McMillan, supra
note 116, at 7 (reporting that "[tihe belief that one has not accomplished worthwhile goals leads
to despair"); WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 2, at 2 (stating that there is "no harsher verdict in most
men's lives than someone else's judgment that they are no longer worth their keep").
140. NEWMAN, supra note 108, at 248.
141. Rosen, supranote 94, at 61-62 (explaining that employees perceive"akind of'option' value"
to their work, because of the possibility of moving to the next level and ever higher in the organization);
see also Darity & Goldsmith, supranote 132, at 125 (noting that a worker's increased fear of becoming
unemployed forces the worker to increase productivity by working harder).
142. See supra note 16.
143. N.R. Kleinfield, The Company as Family,No More, N. Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1996, at Al.
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workers to feel lucky, they actually feel threatened and abandoned.' There
may be an initial surge ofproductivity as those remaining work harder for fear
of losing their jobs, but research shows that this is usually followed by
depression and lethargy. 4 Consequently, their productivity often declines."
D. The Impact of Salary-BasedTerminationson the Employer's Firm
The toll on the surviving workers also negatively affects company morale
and productivity, as suggested by numerous studies of downsizing. 47A recent
study identified fairness at work, and care and concern for employees, as key
influences on employee loyalty."1 But companies that downsize are
"unwittingly destroying the very qualities they need for competitive advantage,
namely their employees' trust and empowerment."49
The loss of morale and loyalty after a downsizing can decrease job
performance and increase the likelihood that the most desirable workers will
look elsewhere for employment. 5 Professor Shore's study showed that
surviving workers "feel threatened, abandoned, burdened with more work, and

144. Barry Shore, The Legacy ofDownsizing: Puttingthe Pieces Back Together,Bus. F.,
Summer/Fall 1996, at 5, 5.
145. Darity & Goldsmith, supra note 132, at 124.
146. Id. at 132.
147. See, e.g., Mark W. Richey, The Impact of CorporateDownsizingon Employees, Bus.
F., Summer 1992, at 9, 10 (reporting survey results showing that fifty-seven percent of layoff
survivors report decreased loyalty to their employers).
148. Retention: Why Loyalty Is Not Enough, HRFocus, Nov. 2000, at 1, 14 (reporting a
study finding thatloyalty, combined with affective commitment, is exhibited by those employees
who are willing to "go the extra mile, help maintain profitable customer relationships, and be
advocates for the company").
149. Mishra et al., supranote 16, at 84; see also Darity & Goldsmith,supra note 132, at
124 (stating that "[m]any managers reported that layoffs have a decidedly negative effect on
their subordinates' productivity, morale and commitment to the organization"); DoWNs,
supra note 20, at 202-03 (stating thatmore than half ofwhite-collar workers surveyed report they
do not trust top management because managers state an economic need for cutbacks while the
managers themselves are highly paid); FRAsER, supranote 16, at 111-12 (reporting that workers
who believe management is not interested in their welfare are less loyal to their companies);
FREDERICKF. REICHHELD,THELOYALTYEFFECr: THEHIDDENFORCEBEHINDGRoWTHPRoFITs,

AND LASTING VALUE 3, 95 (1996) (stating that layoffs "destroy loyalty," and that "the only way
to achieve sustainableimprovement in performance is by building sustainableimprovements
in value creation and loyalty"); Harry J. Van Buren U1, The Bindingness of Social and
PsychologicalContracts: Toward a Theory of SocialResponsibility in Downsizing, 25 J. Bus.
ETHics 205, 208 (2000) (stating that firms that violate "psychological contracts" to treat
employees equitably often experience a "decline in employee loyalty"); VAN HORN, supra note
131, at 81 (quoting workers who are less loyal to their employers because they believe that
management is interested only in profit).
150. See Joseph A. Raelin, Job SecurityforProfessionals,PERSONNEL, July 1987, at 40,
45; Richey, supranote 147, at 11.
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subject to greater job stress."'' He identified poor morale as the most
52
prominent reason that the expected benefits of downsizing are not achieved.
The surviving workers may disassociate themselves mentally from the
company or even become enraged at it. A study in the Sloan Management
Review concluded that the survivors of downsizings become suspicious of
management and may see themselves "as independent contractors, viewing the
organization in purely instrumental terms." 's3 Another professor's study found
that "[w]hen some employees are terminated," the survivors "experience long
IS4
periods of rage toward the company and paranoia that they may be next.'
Other studies have reached similar conclusions.' 55
In the drive to downsize, the company loses its investment in important
worker experience. ' In a downsizing, "key talent" is lost along with
"organizational memory."'5 7 The cost of hiring and training a worker and the
worker's experience on the job create an asset that does not appear on a current
balance sheet, but nonetheless has economic value.' 5 Moreover, worker
alienation may mean companies will derive less economic benefit from the
training they gave surviving workers, who become "less willing to commit to
a job for the long run for fear of being displaced when they are old."'1 9 Even
teamwork among workers may suffer as experienced employees fear that by
60
training new workers they will put their own jobs in jeopardy.'
6
The rationale usually given for downsizing is that it will increase profits.' 62
Some firms do find that downsizing increases their productivity and profits,'
and it may lead to at least short-term increases in companies' stock prices.' 63

151. See Shore, supranote 144, at 5.
152. Id. at 6, 8.
153. Mishra, et al., supra note 16, at 85.
154. Shore, supra note 144, at 7.
155. See FRASER, supra note 16, at 111-12 (reporting anecdotal evidence that surviving
workers care less about their jobs); PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE 148 (1990)
(reporting that when workers feel individual employees are being treated unfairly, they may be
unwilling to do more than "the bare minimum necessary to keep theirjob").
156. See Mishra et al., supra note 16, at 84 (stating that the "loss of key talent" diminishes
the expected returns from downsizing); WEILER, supranote 155, at 147 (explaining that a new
employee must acquire knowledge specific to the job and employer).
One study pegged the cost of replacing a worker at an average of $30,000. Why Loyalty Is
Not Enough, supranote 148, at 15.
157. Mishra et al., supra note 16, at 84. See also Robert J. Grossman, Damaged,
Downsized Souls: How to Revitalize the Workplace, H.R. MAG., May 1996, at 54, 62 (stating
that with each termination, a business "loses some of its corporate memory").
158. See Grossman, supra note 158, at 62 (stating that workers' training and the
information they absorb on the job create an asset).
159. Minda, Aging Workers, supra note 18, at 592.
160. WEILER, supra note 155, at 149-50.
161. See Uchitelle & Kleinfield, supra note 15; VANHORN, supra note 131, at 105.
162. See VAN HORN, supra note 13 1, at 102 (noting that while some firms report positive
results from layoffs, layoffs are "a mixed bag of positive and negative outcomes").
163. See Uchitelle & Kleinfield, supra note 15 (describing increases in stock prices
following layoffs).
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But there is now a considerable body of evidence that reveals that these results
are often ephemeral. Studies show that downsizing companies "went on to trail
their industries in productivity, profitability and shareholder value."'" In a
background paper for a Twentieth Century Fund task force report on retaining
America's workforce, Professor Carl Van Horn collected study results showing
that most downsizing firms do not experience increases in productivity or
profits. 6s An analysis of available studies prompted human resources expert
Alan Downs to conclude that the "wholesale acceptance of layoffs" is a "risky,
painful, and inhumane form of management."'" Consultant Frederick
Reichheldput it bluntly, "The truth is, layoffs lowerproductivity; in some cases
they decimate it."'"
Clearly it is not the courts' role under the ADEA to second-guess
employers' business judgments, even where they may be erroneous or
illogical. 6 1 The mounting evidence that layoffs often harm the companies that
conduct them does not gainsay that basic principle. It does, however, suggest
that a public policy that enshrines layoffs, downsizings, and salary-based
terminations has a shaky foundation indeed.

164. Adam Cohen & Cathy Booth Thomas, Inside a Layoff. An Up-CloseLook at How
One Company Handles the Delicate Task of Downsizing, TIME, Apr. 16, 2001, at 38, 40
(describing Michigan Business School professor Kim Cameron's summary ofstudies onlayoffs);
see alsoDe Meuse et al., supranote 16, at 520 (concluding from data that layoffs do not improve
or even halt a decline in financial performance); DOwNs, supra note 20, at 11-13 (reporting
studies showing the negative effects of downsizing); Ronald Henkoff, Getting Beyond
Downsizing, FORTUNE, Jan. 10, 1994, at 58, 58 (reporting that only thirty-four percent of
downsizing companies reported increases in productivity and only forty-five percent have seen
operating profits improve); Mishra et al., supra note 16, at 84 (stating that "[t]he promised
payoffs of downsizing have been mixed at best"); VAN HORN, supra note 131, at 103 (noting
numerous empirical studies showing "that many firms are doing a poor job of implementing
cutbacks and are not achieving their goals").
165. See also VAN HORN, supra note 131, at 103. According to British management
consultant Gary Hammel, "This continuous downsizing-it's corporate anorexia. You can get
thin, but it's not the way to get healthy." Id. at 106 (quoting Steven Pearlstein, Corporate
Cutbacks Yet to Pay Off,WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 1994, at B6).
166. DoWNs, supra note 20, at 13.
167. REIcHH, supranote 149, at 146 (citing examples of lowerproductivity after downsizing).
168. Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d 999, 1006 (10th Cir. 1996) (stating that the
ADEA does not prohibit discrimination between applicants and incumbent employees); see also
EEOC v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 100 F.3d 1173, 1187 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating that "the ADEA
plays no role" in evaluating the merits of a company's business decisions); Grafenhain v. Pabst
Brewing Co., 827 F.2d 13, 21 n.8 (7th Cir. 1987) (stating that "although the ADEA does not
hand federal courts a roving commission to review business judgments, the ADEA does create
a cause of action againstbusiness decisions that merge with age discrimination"); Marks v. Loral
Corp., 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 22 (Ct. App. 1997) ("A court 'does not sit as a super-personnel
department that reexamines an entity's business decisions."' (quoting Dale v. Chicago Tribune
Co., 797 F.2d 458, 464 (7th Cir. 1986))).
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E. The Impact of Salary-BasedTerminations on Society
The Wirtz Report described effects of age discrimination beyond those on
the unemployed older worker. Effects on society included the loss of "a million
man-years of productive time" each year due to unemployment of older
workers, 6 9 with even more productivity lost because of "forced, compulsory,
or automatic retirement.' 170 The report identified the cost of unemployment
insurance for victims of age discrimination as another component of society's
17
cost. '

Society continues to suffer such losses when older workers are terminated.
A 1996 article in the JournalofSocio-Economicsidentified "lower tax revenue
and increased government expenditures on unemployment insurance and social
programs" as effects of unemployment,77 effects that increase with older
workers17 because of their greater difficulty in finding new jobs. 74 Moreover,
7
displaced older workers contribute less to the economy as consumers. 1
Downsizings of older workers will exacerbate the social security crisis, as
displaced workers create a drain on the social security system.' 76 Opportunistic
firings ofthose nearing retirement will also widen income inequality, as wealth
is shifted from middle-class workers to managers whose compensation is tied
to stock values. 77 Professor Newman summarized widespread worker
displacement as adding
"up to a monumental waste of intelligence, motivation,
78
and aspiration.''
Even "social institutions like schools and churches are often ripped apart"
when companies are downsized. 179 Perhaps the most subtle but far-reaching
effect of terminations of older workers will be to increase older workers'
alienation in society. Employees may have hoped their hard work would lead
to success, but the culture of the bottom line sends the disillusioning message

169. WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 2, at 53.
170. Id. at 54.
171. Id.
172. Goldsmith et al., supra note 134, at 334; see also DowNs, supranote 20, at 55, 64-65
(discussing the additional government expenditures and lost tax revenues occasioned by worker
displacement).
173. See Jerome M. Rosow, Extending Working Life, in THE AGING OF THE AMERICAN
WORK FORCE 399,402 (Irving Bluestone et al. eds., 1990) (discussing data showing that "early
retirement represented a significant loss in federal revenues").
174. See supra notes 123-26 and accompanying text.
175. See Rosow, supranote 173, at 403 (noting that increased employment ofolder workers would
promote their ability to contnbute to the Gross National Product as consumers).
176. Minda, Aging Workers, supra note 18, at 579-80.
177. See id. at 573, 597.
178. NEWMAN, supra note 108, at 240.

179. See DOWNs, supra note 20, at 19; Uchitelle & Kleinfield, supranote 15 (describing
the harm to civic groups caused by job loss).
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that instead, they can look forward to becoming prime candidates for
termination.8"
IV. THE ROLE OF VALUES IN THE ANALYSIS

Thomas Davenport, who helped create the downsizing trend,"" later
described it as a good idea that went "offthe tracks so badly" due to its cavalier
treatment of people. 2 How society decides to treat salary-based terminations
of older workers is a social and political decisionbased on values. Two primary
strains of values appear in case law and commentary on this subject. One
makes companies' bottom-line profit the measure of a corporate decision's
legitimacy. The other strain recognizes that the bottom line cannot measure
what is truly important,'8 3 and is thus more consistent with our higher national
values.
A. Economic Reasoning: The PrimacyofProfit
Despite the negative effects of worker displacement, corporations continue
to engage in layoffs,' even when they are not in financial difficulty.' The
usual explanation is that the first goal of corporate executives is to increase
corporate profit.8 6 Courts have reinforced this emphasis on the bottom line,
reasoning that in a free market, companies must be free to do whatever is
necessary to increase profits. For example, Judge Easterbrook's influential
dissent in Metz approved salary-based terminations on the ground that wages

180. See supra notes 142-44 & 151-55 and accompanying text
181. See generally Thomas IL Davenport & James E. Short, The New IndustrialEngineering:
Information Technology and Business Process Redesign, SLOAN MGMT. REv., Summer 1990, at 11
(discussing the relationship between information technology and business redesign).
182. Thomas H. Davenport, The Fad That ForgotPeople, FAsT COMPANY, (Nov. 1995),
at http:/lwww.fastcompany.comfonline/Ol/reengin.htnl.
183. See CHRISTOPHER CONTE & ALBERT R. CARR,U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, AN OuTLINE OF
THEU.S. ECONOMY, athttp://usinfo.state.gov/productslpubs/oeconlchap 11.htm (last visited Jan.
24, 2002) (quoting the late Senator Robert Kennedy as stating that gross national product
"measures neither our wit nor our courage; neither our wisdom nor our learning; neither our
compassion nor our devotion to our country; it measures everything, in short, except that which
makes life worthwhile. And it can tell us everything about America except why we are proud to
be Americans.").
184. See Philip M. Berkowitz, Workforce Reductions: They Are Back, N.Y. L.J., May 31,
2001, at 5 (listing recent layoffs at such major corporations as Dell, Coming, Motorola,
Goodyear, and Sears). See also infra notes 205-07 and accompanying text.

185. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
186. See Dennis P. Quinn & Thomas M. Jones,AnAgentMorality View ofBusinessPolicy,
20 ACAD. MGMT. REv. 22, 22 (1995) (stating that one view of business policy holds that
maximizing the company's present value is the "appropriate motivating principle for
management," but proposing instead a view based on "principled moral reasoning")
(Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
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correspond to profitability.'"" Similarly, the California Court of Appeal
approved a salary-based termination as based on a reasonable factor other than
age with the explanation that "salary is as 'reasonable' a factor as is imaginable
in a market economy."' 88 The court added that Congress did not intend the
ADEA to inhibit the "free market economy" or "decision-making on the basis
of cost" through which "real jobs and wealth are created." 89 The Sixth Circuit
voiced perhaps a more cynical expression of the same idea, commenting that
Congress and the courts have made the social judgment that "[t]he rules of the
marketplace govern."'9 As Professor Minda put it, today "it is the 'bottom

line,' more19 1 than anything else, that drives corporate and some judicial
thinking.'

Behind this emphasis on the bottom line are the short-term profits of the
shareholders and the Chief Executive Officer (CEO). The drive to increase
shareholder revenue frequently occurs because the chief executive's salary and
bonuses are tied to the company's stock price. 92 This encourages CEOs to
engage in "snapshot accounting," which forsakes the long view for the profit
of the moment.'9 Under the primacy of profit in today's business climate
"anything is acceptable as long as it is legal and makes money. ' 94
Those who would freely allow salary-based terminations contend that a
dispassionate focus on profitability benefits society, including the workers that
the ADEA seeks to protect.' 9 This reasoning is based on the premise that
members of a free-market system will act to maximize their own wealth,
thereby increasing society's wealth and benefitting all of its members.' 96 But

187. Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc., 828 F.2d 1202, 1219 (7th Cir 1987).
188. Marks v. Loral Corp., 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1,9-10 (Ct. App. 1997) (holding that a salarybased termination violated neither the ADEA nor California's Fair Employment and Housing
Act).
189. Id. at 24.
190. Allen v. Diebold, Inc., 33 F.3d 674, 679 (6th Cir. 1994).
191. Minda, OpportunisticDownsizing, supra note 17, at 550.
192. See id.at 549; DowNs, supra note 20, at 24-26; R.C. Longworth, CEOPay531 limes
That of Workers Study: Gap Grows DespiteDownturn, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 28, 2001, § 3, at I
(discussing a study by the Institute for Policy Studies and United for a Fair Economy); Widening
Pay Gap,WASH. POST, May 4, 1997, at H2; Louis Uchitelle, 1995 Was GoodforCompanies,and
Greatfor a Lot of C.E.O.'s, N.Y.TIMEs, Mar. 29, 1996, at Al. A recent study suggests that
executives have managed to insulate themselves in the current stock market downturn. The study
reports that the "layoff leaders" of the year 2000 received large pay raises. SARAH ANDERSON ET
AL., INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES AND UNITED FOR A FAIR ECONOMY ExECunVE ExcEss 6

(2001).
193. See REICHHELD, supra note 149, at 4.
194. DowNs, supra note 20, at 26.
195. See Richard A. Posner, EmploymentDiscrimination:Age Discriminationand Sexual
Harassment, 19 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 421, 434 (1999) [hereinafter Posner, Employment
Discrimination] (arguing that if employers are prevented from using efficient methods of

analyzing their costs, workers as a whole will be affected).
196. See Jeanne L. Schroeder, Rationalityin Law andEconomics Scholarship, 79 OR. L.
REV. 147, 251-52 (2000).
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this approach, focused on wealth for the sake of wealth,197 recognizes only part
of the picture. It ignores effects on the terminated workers19 and others,' 99 that
may be intangible and not always quantifiable, but nevertheless deserve
attention because they profoundly affect people's lives.
Some writers on the subject display an optimism that seems unwarranted
in the light of subsequent developments.0 0 In his dissent in Metz, Judge
Easterbrook discussed the human capital theory, acknowledging the temptation
for employers to fire more highly paid older workers.2 1 However, he theorized
that such opportunism would be curtailed by firms' desire to protect their
reputations. 2 2 Judge Posner similarly acknowledged the temptation for
employers to fire older workers to save on pension costs, but said this was
"shortsighted" because it would create "ill will among employees" and force
employers to pay higher salaries to new employees to compensate for the
risk.20 3 But perhaps because it is difficult for younger workers to assess and act
on companies' reputations, 2' such compunctions have not curtailed
opportunistic firings of older workers.
The number of opportunistic firings cannot be known,2 5 but recent news
reports indicate that rather than tapering off, they are on the rise. A recent
Chicago Tribune article reported that age discrimination complaints are
increasing due to "[c]orporate America's determination to cut costs by weeding
out many of its highest-paid workers." 206 Numerous other news accounts
support this conclusion. 20 7 Because salary-based terminations remain

197. See id. at 252.
198. See supra Part III.B.
199. See supra Parts I1.C - IR.E.
200. See Alexander, supranote 22, at 104 (citing authorities that question Judge Easterbrook's
optimistic claims that the market will prevent unreasonable discrimination based on age).
201. Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc., 828 F.2d 1202, 1221 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J.,
dissenting).
202. Id.
203. Visser v. Packer Eng'g Assoc., Inc., 924 F.2d 655, 657 (7th Cir. 1991).
204. Minda, OpportunisticDownsizing,supra note 17, at 550-51 (stating that reputation
is not an effective check on firms' behavior unless younger workers can act on the reputation by
going elsewhere); Schwab, supranote 93, at 27 (stating that young workers cannot easily assess
employers' reputations partlybecause knowledge of opportunistic firings is not easily exchanged
between generations).
205. See Glen Fest, Age Angle: Despite Hard-WorkingReputations, Older Workers Say
They Believe They're Victims of Discrimination,STAR-TELEGRAM (Fort Worth), Apr. 9,2001,
Tarrant Bus. Section, at 9 (quoting AARP policy advisor Sara Rix as saying that "[s]niffing out
age discrimination is nearly impossible").
206. Robert Manor & T. Shawn Taylor, Age-Bias ComplaintsUp Sharply, CHI.TRIB., July
15, 2001, § 1, at 1.
207. See, e.g., Berkowitz, supra note 184, at 5 (reporting that workforce reductions have
increased in 2001); Bruce Butterfield, 'AVery Scary Time' Laid-OffOlder WorkersSee Options
Fade as Boom Ends, BOSTON SUN. GLOBE, May 20, 2001, at HI (quoting Boston career center
manager Rosemary Alexander as saying "It may be hard to prove, butjob discrimination is alive
and well for older workers. It's a real problem today."); Fest, supranote 205, (quoting a trade
organization head as saying that "companies routinely ignore older candidates because of salary
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widespread, Professor Minda argued, the "ADEA must be allowed to protect
late-career employees."2 '

B. Values Beyond Economics
And how do you benefit ifyou gain the whole world but lose
your own soul in the process?2"
Although public discourse in the United States has paid much lip service
to "values" lately,210 the word often appears without definition. If we are
serious about our values, we should examine their content. Some current
discussion of business decisions has overemphasized the value of business
profitability.2" Americans appreciate economic success, but more humane
values are also deeply rooted in our culture. Americans are a compassionate
people who care about the individual and believe in fairness. Two presidents

in the last century expressed these high values succinctly. President Theodore
Roosevelt exhorted Americans that "[t]his country will not be a permanently
'2
good place for us to live unless it's a good place for all of us to live."
President Woodrow Wilson said, "Sometimes people call me an idealist. Well,
that is the way I know I am an American. America is the only idealistic nation
in the world. 2 13
In the context of the ADEA, these nobler values should prompt society to

look beyond profit to the well-being of individual employees. That approach

reasons"); Mike Myers, UnderPressurein the New Economy, STARTRiB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul),
Jan. 22, 2001, at 1D (reporting that in the 1990s "older, experienced employees" were laid off
more than younger workers).
See also Minda, Aging Workers, supra note 18, at 571 & n.35 (citing Bureau of Labor
Statistics data that show older workers' risk of losing theirjobs was increasing in the mid 1990s
and that olderworkers "suffered most as aresult ofcorporate downsizing"); Sweeney, supranote
61, at 1530 n.13 (listing sources reporting job loss by middle-aged workers as a result of
downsizings).
208. Minda, Opportunistic Downsizing, supra note 17, at 566. But see Issacharoff &
Harris, supra note 63, at 836-37 (arguing that antidiscrimination law should not apply to older
Americans, who are "not penurious" and not in need of special treatment).
209. Mark 8:36 (New Living Translation 1996).
210. See George F. Will, Forget Values, Let's Talk Virtues, WASH. PosT, May 25, 2000 at
A37 (commenting that "everyone" is talking about values).
211. See Allen v. Diebold, Inc., 33 F.3d 674,676 (6th Cir. 1994) (stating that "[t]he ADEA
was not intended to protect older workers from the often harsh economic realities of common
business decisions and the hardships associated with corporate reorganizations, downsizing,
plant closings and relocations"); Marks v. Loral Corp., 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 9-10 (Ct. App. 1997)
(stating that "[a] differentiation based on salary is as 'reasonable' a factor as is imaginable in a
market economy"); Posner, Employment Discrimination,supra note 195, at 429 n.22 (1999)
(arguing that treating salary-based decisions as age discrimination would hinder firms' "rational
steps to reduce their costs").
212. See Rheta Grimsley Johnson, Reflections of an Idealistic Nation, THE ATLANTA J.CoNsT., July 5, 1995, at B1 (quoting President Roosevelt).
213. See id. (quoting President Wilson).
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is not a complete stranger to the business world. David Packard, co-founder of
Hewlett-Packard, believed good management would consider the best interests
of three corporate constituents: shareholders, management, and employees.2" 4
Similarly, business ethicists today call forprincipledbehavior that considers the
good of the employees. For example, Professor Thomas Dunfee has advocated
that managers should be guided by more than the bottom line: they must
consider the moral preferences of employees and "manifest universal norms,"21
which are "reflected in a convergence of religious, philosophical, and cultural
beliefs. 216 Business ethics professors Dennis Quinn and Thomas Jones argue
that "[b]usinesses have no special rules or states that waive the moral
' They have articulated four
obligations that managers have as humans."217
commonly recognized "core principles": avoiding harm to others, respecting
their autonomy, avoiding lying, and honoring agreements.2"' Ifmanagers wish
to be moral, say Quinn and Jones, they "must not put duty to maximize the
wealth of shareholders ahead of [the] four moral principles."21 9These principles
are congruent with the Judeo-Christian ethics to which most U.S. citizens
subscribe," 0 as well as with the principles of other major religions,"' and it is
curious that they should be largely absent from current discussion of the law's
approach to older workers.
Particularly in the early years after passage of the ADEA, courts
recognized values beyond profit. For example, in Graefenhain v. Pabst
Brewing Co., the court acknowledged that retention of older, more highly-paid
employees frequently competes with "conceptions of economic efficiency," but
the court said that the ADEA represents "a choice among these values. It stands
for the proposition that this is a better country for its willingness to pay the
costs for treating older employees fairly."
As Professor Katherine Newman has written, "We should not allow a
distorted vision of free-market economics to glorify irresponsibility and lack

214. See DoWNs, supra note 21, at 22-23; FRASER, supra note 16, at 110.
215. Dunfee, supra note 103, at 157. See also Van Buren, supra note 149, at 207
(proposing that business decisions should be guided by the premise that "employers owe duties
to employees").
216. Dunfee, supra note 103, at 153.
217. See Quinn & Jones, supra note 186, at 30 (citing ALAN H. GOLDMAN, THE MORAL
FOUNDATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHics

(1980)).

218. Id. See also Mumford & Hendricks, supranote 16, at 29 (arguing that "values are as
important, if not more important, than they have ever been").
219. Quinn & Jones, supranote 186, at 40.
220. See Timothy L. Hall, Religion and Civic Virtue: A JustificationofFree Exercise, 67
TUL. L. REV. 87, 107-09 (1992) (citing authorities for the proposition that "we are a religious
people").
221. See id at 111 & n.98 (quoting religious sources that promote conduct beyond individual
selfishness, including "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." Leviticus 19:18).
222. Graefenhain v. Pabst Brewing Co., 827 F.2d 13, 21 n.8 (7th Cir. 1987).
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of commitment." 2" We can choose a more nuanced and humane approach
rather than simple reliance on the bottom line.
V. TOWARD A SOLUTION

A. Analytic Basesfor Change
Congress considered the concerns of both employers and employees when
enacting the ADEA, 224 and a reasoned approach to applying the Act should do
so as well. Lately, however, interpretation of the Act has been heavily skewed
toward employers. 2" There are sound bases for restoring a fairer balance.
Corporations are created by statute, and their officers and directors are
afforded the special protection of immunity from some kinds of liability.' 6
Values beyond profit are part of our laws regulating corporations. We require
corporations and other businesses to act contrary to their apparent economic
interest in various settings such as antitrust, 7 race discrimination,' and
environmental law.22 9 In these contexts, we have decided to pay the cost of

"more important remedial and social objectives" than profitY Moreover, the
American Law Institute has recognized that corporations may take into account
ethical values other than shareholder gain. Its Principles of Corporate
Governanceprovides that "[e]ven if corporate profit and shareholder gain are
not thereby enhanced," a corporation "[m]ay take into account ethical
considerations that are reasonably regarded as appropriate to the responsible
conduct ofbusiness."' The United States Business Roundtable recognizes that
"'[c]orporations are chartered to serve both their shareholders and society as a
whole,"' including their employees. 2 Some states have codified provisions,

223.
224.
225.
226.

NEWMAN, supra note 108, at 239.
See Kaminshine, supra note 86, at 267-72.
See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
See Robert B. Thompson, UnpackingLimitedLiabiliy: Directand VcariousLiabilityof
CorporateParticipantsfor Torts of the Enterprise,47 VAND. L. REV.1,6-8 (1994).

227. See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
228. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994). Racial discrimination in employment is economically
inefficient in that it narrows the pool of potential employees. See Sue A. Krenek, Note, Beyond
ReasonableAccommodation, 72 TaX. L. REV. 1969, 1993 (1994). Furthermore, threats by third
parties not to deal with nondiscriminatory employers may provide an economic rationale for
discriminatory decisions. Id. at 1995-96.
229. See 42 U.S.C. § 7651 (1994).
230. See Kaminshine, supra note 86, at 232.
231. AM. LAW NSr., 1PRINQMPM OF COPPORATE GOVERNA

ANALYSIS ANMREMNS21ATIONS

§ Z01(bX2) (1994).
232. See Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders:InterpretingCorporateConstituency Statutes,61
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 14, 21 (1992) (citing The Business Roundtable, Corporate Governance and
American Competitiveness,46 Bus. LAW. 241,244 (1990)).
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providing, for example, that in making decisions, corporate directors may
consider the interests of such constituencies as the employees and society. 3
The question, then, is not whether we can regulate businesses-we do so
now. The question is whether we choose to regulate salary-based terminations
of older workers. As the Wirtz Report stated, "The development of responsible
and effective public policy regarding discrimination based on age requires as
steadfast and unfearing confrontation of reality as did the development of'
other discrimination policies. 4 If we want to live up to our highest ideals
today, we must squarely confront the harsh realities of the current spate of
salary-based terminations of older workers.
Some commentators have argued that the ADEA was not meant to cover
terminations, saying that Congress was focused more on hiring problems than
on terminations." That focus is not surprising in light of the then widespread
practice of employment advertisements overtly stating that older workers need
not applyY 6 At that time, the wave of downsizings and the emphasis on the
bottom line of the 1980s and 1990s237 were trends not yet realized. However,

that does not mean that Congress meant to exempt salary-based terminations.
When courts conclude that the ADEA was not meant to remedy salary-based
terminations, they gloss over aspects of the Act's language and legislative
history that suggest othervise.
The Wirtz Report concluded that limits placed on older workers were due
to assumptions made "without consideration of a particular applicant's
individual qualifications.""s More specifically, the report brought the problem
of salary-based decisions to the attention of Congress, listing employers'
statements that they could "hire younger workers for less money, and concern
that older workers' earnings expectations are 'too high.,,, 9 The report
expressed "human concern" for the worker whose economic value "becomes
marginal in traditional market place terms," 2" and added that society has a stark
economic choice: it can pay, "as customers," an older employee's higher wage,
or, "in the alternative, pay[], as taxpayers, the full amount of his 'welfare'

233. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251(5) (West Supp. 2001); Useem, supranote 15, at
53 (referring to state legislation enacted in the 1970s and early 1980s that incorporated the
concerns of groups other than the shareholders). For a discussion of corporate constituency
statutes see Wai Shun Wilson Leung, The Inadequacy of ShareholderPrimacy: A Proposed
CorporateRegime That Recognizes Non-ShareholderInterests, 30 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS.
587, 633 (1997) (advocating enactment of corporate constituency statutes that require
management to consider nonshareholder constituents, including employees).

234. WIRTz REPORT, supra note 2, at 4.
235. See Issacharoff& Harris, supranote 63, at 786, 796-97.
236. See WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 2, at 17-18.
237. See DOWNs, supra note 20, at 3 (describing in 1995 "[t]he layoff fad of the past
fifteen years'); see generally FRASER, supra note 16, at I10-11 (describing an increase in
downsizings in the 1980s and 1990s).
238. WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 2, at 17-18.
239. Id. at 23.
240. Id. at 8.
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upkeep (and get[] nothing in return)."" The report also mentioned financial
loss to society due to "forced, compulsory, or automatic" retirement. 2 Salarybased terminations were thus clearly before the legislators as they deliberated
on the ADEA. When the Act was formulated, Congress emphasized that older
workers should be evaluated on their own abilities, 43 which strongly suggests
disapproval of terminations based not on ability but on pay.
Yet some would eviscerate the ADEA. For example, Judge Posner has
stated that older workers are not in need of protection because they are
prosperous and "no longer constitute an oppressed class." 2" The basis for this
assertion is not clear; government statistics show that for two-thirds of older
Americans the major source of income is social security,' " whichprovides only
a minimal standard of living.2' Judge Posner has even called the ADEA "a
particularly misbegotten venture in tilting at the windmills of ageism."247 But
the Act and its legislative history indicate that Congress intended the Act to be
read more expansively than it currently is. As Professor Minda retorted to
Judge Posner, opportunistic terminations of older workers are an important
reason for ADEA protection, and in ignoring their dangers, "Posner
subordinates the anti-discrimination principle ofADEA to the cost containment
rationales of business." 2' " Similarly, Professor Christine Jolls has argued that
the ADEA is necessary to check employers' inclination to deprive older
workers, including mobile workers, of the higher wages they are due under an
implicit bargain throughout their work lives. " '

241. Id.

242. Id. at 53-55. The Report also noted the "personal frustrations and anxieties" resulting
from uncertainties arising when the "opportunity to retire has been converted into forced
retirement, and where there is no new opportunity for satisfying occupation." Id. at 57.
243. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1994) (stating that the purpose of the ADEA is "to promote
employment of older persons based on their ability rather than age").
244. Posner, Employment Discrimination,supra note 195, at 423-24. See also Issacharoff
& Harris, supra note 63, at 837 (stating that older Americans are among society's "most
advantaged and secure").
245. Soc. SEc.ADMIN.,PuB.No.05-10055,THEFUTUROFSOCALSEcURrn'Y (Aug. 2000),

available at http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/10055.html; see also 2 MARK A. RoTHSTEN ET AL.,
EMPLOYMENTLAW § 10.1, at 426 (2d ed. 1999) (stating that social security "provid[es] income
to three times as many older individuals as do private pensions").
246. See Camilla E. Watson, Machiavelliand the PoliticsoffWelfare, NationalHealth,and
Old Age: A ComparativePerspective of the Policies of the United States and Canada,1993

UTAH L. REV. 1337, 1345.
247. RICHARD A. POsNER, AGING AND OLD AGE 361 (1995).
248. Minda, OpportunisticDownsizing, supra note 17, at 560-61.
249. Jolls, supranote 98, at 1829.
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B. ProposedSolutions
1. Changes to CaseLaw
Within the contours of existing ADEA law,25 there are ways to afford
relief to older workers terminated not because of their individual abilities, but
because of their higher salaries.
First, the proxy doctrine could be applied by the courts, as earlier cases
applied it, to encompass factors so closely correlated with age as to be
functionally identical with them.2 " The recent spate of employers justifying
older workers' terminations because of their higher salaries252 suggests that
despite what some courts have said,253 there is a meaningful correlation
between age and salary that is creating harm and should be addressed through
age discrimination law.
This broad proxy doctrine comports with the statutory language.
Insufficient attention has been given to the core language that proscribes
limiting an older worker "in any way which would... tend to deprive" the
worker of employment opportunities "because ofsuch individual's age. 254 The
italicized language indicates a broad purpose. Terminating a worker because
of his high salary tends to limit his employment in a way that is less
analytically direct, but fits the plain meaning of in any way. A proxy doctrine
that recognizes age and salary as statutorily equivalent would effectuate this
language. Such a proxy doctrine would also be congruent with (1) the
Congressional finding that older workers are disadvantaged both in retaining
employment and in regaining it once lost 55 and (2) the Wirtz Report's concern
about older workers whose salaries are high and who will become drains on
society without work.2" 6 This broad age proxy doctrine would help "thwart

250. Some commentators have suggested that the ADEA is not the best method for
remedying unfair job terminations of older workers. See Issacharoff& Harris, supranote 63, at
796-801 (arguing that "protection oflong-term employees couldbe accomplished byrecognizing
the important role of common law actions" or through the creation of"a statutory abrogation of
employment at will"); Kathleen C. McGowan, Note, Unequal Opportunity in At-Will
Employment: The SearchforaRemedy, 72 ST.JoHN'sL. REv. 141,182-83 (1998) (arguing that
a change in the at-will doctrine is a more appropriate way to address the problem of opportunistic
terminations).
251. See supranotes 67-69 and accompanying text.
252. See supra notes 206-07.
253. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 611 (1993) ("[Ain employee's age is
analytically distinct from his years of service.").
254. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (1994) (emphasis added).
255. See id. § 621(a)(1).
256. See supra notes 238-42 and accompanying text.
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more sophisticated attempts by employers to discriminate against aging
'
workers on the basis of age."257
Both Professor Minda and Professor Schwab believe thatHazenPaperCo.
v. Biggins did not close the door on application of this theory to salary-based
claims. 8 Professor Schwab bases his argument on the Court's "enigmatic"
citation ofMetz v. TransitMix, Inc., which he believes indicates support for the
broader proxy approach." 9 Moreover, the Court's discussion of proxy theory
in Hazen Paperis arguably dictum, since it lies outside the Court's carefully
crafted holding.26 Thus, even if the Supreme Court does not clarify this point,
the lower courts may have some freedom to apply a broad proxy approach.
A broad proxy theory will be particularly useful in preempting a
"reasonable factor other than age" defense because salary would be equated
with age and therefore not "other than age." 6 It will also provide a workable
framework for an individual who is the sole object of discriminatory conduct.262
The alternative disparate impact framework involves a statistical showing that
a challenged practice disproportionately affects a protected group,263 a showing
that the sole plaintiff will have difficulty making.
Second, to the extent that the "reasonable factors other than age" defense
does apply, 2" economically-based decisions correlated with age should be
required to meet a reasonableness requirement. In the first twenty-five years of
the ADEA, several courts effectively applied such a requirement.265 However,
' 66
lately some courts have attempted to bypass the statute's word "reasonable"
by equating the ADEA with the Equal Pay Act, under which a business
decision's reasonableness is not a factor.267 These analyses ignore a significant
257. Minda, OpportunisticDownsizing, supra note 17, at 539; see also Spindler, supra
note 61, at 822 (noting that an employer could raise the salary of an older worker and then fire
the worker on economic grounds).
258. Minda, OpportunisticDownsizing,supra note 17, at 538-39 (interpreting Schwab's
reading of Hazen Paper);Schwab, supra note 93, at 44-45.
259. Schwab, supra note 93, at 44-45.
260. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 613 (1993).
261. See Kaminshine, supra note 86, at 264.
262. See infra notes 295-96 and accompanying text.
263. See Clemons & Bales, supra note 86, at 7-8.
264. 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(1) (1994).
265. Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State Coll., 702 F.2d 686,692-93 (8th Cir. 1983) (affirming
a judgment in favor of a professor terminated for salary reasons and stating that "economic
savings" was not "a legitimate justification under the ADEA for an employment selection
criterion"); Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027,1034 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding in favor of a
terminated employee and stating that economic reasons would notjustify termination for the agerelated criterion of experience level); Marshall v. Arlene Knitwear, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 715, 728
(E.D.N.Y. 1978) (finding in favor of an employee terminated for salary reasons and stating that
under the ADEA, economic savings "directly related to an employee's age" may not be used as
a basis for termination), aff'd in part,rev'd in part,608 F.2d 1369 (2d Cir. 1979).
266. 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(1) (1994).
267. E.g., Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d 999, 1008 (10th Cir. 1996) (denying a
disparate impact cause of action under the ADEA); EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d
1073, 1076-78 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that school's policy of linking salary to experience was
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point: the Equal Pay Act allows discrimination based on a factor "other than
sex," but does not include the ADEA's important "reasonable" qualifier.2 61 One
commentator even pointed out a court's erasure of the word "reasonable" from
the ADEA through the use of ellipses, even while that court purported to focus
closely on the statutory language.269
Of course, ignoring words of a statute does not comport with accepted
statutory analysis 7 If the word "reasonable" is to be more than surplusage,
then the possibility of "unreasonable" factors must exist. When it passed the
ADEA, Congress had before it the Wirtz Report's mention of salary-based
terminations27' and may well have viewed them as a potentially "unreasonable"
factor that must be scrutinized. Moreover, economic justifications do not
exonerate companies in other discrimination contexts. 27 Particularly where an
employer is not in economic difficulty, courts should inquire into the
reasonableness of a salary-based termination, requiring the company to show
real necessity beyond a simple desire to increase profits. No longer should
employers be exonerated by any economic reason they may offer to justify a
salary-based termination.
Third, the disparate impact theory could be accepted by the courts as
applicable to ADEA cases, including salary-based termination cases. 3 The
language of the statute supports a disparate impact approach. Although the
ADEA contains no specific reference to that approach, neither did the original
Title VII, the Act that spawned the disparate impact approach.7 4 This is not
surprising because the disparate impact theory had not yet been articulated
when these acts were passed. 5 Since Congress could not use the term
"disparate impact," which had not yet been coined, it used the words "tend"

and "in any way" to suggest that an indirect approach was appropriate under

a reasonable economic justification for not hiring an older teacher).
268. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1994).
269. Johnson, supra note 84, at 322-23 (exposing the Mullin court's use of an ellipsis to
omit the word "reasonable" as a basis for holding that disparate impact claims are not available
under the ADEA). See Mullin v. Raytheon Co., 164 F.3d 696, 702 (1st Cir. 1999).
270. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979) (stating that in construing a
statute, the Court is "obliged to give effect, if possible, to every word Congress used").

271. See WIRIZIIEPORT, supra note 2, at 23.
272. See Kaminshine,supra note 86, at 240 (noting the Title VII provides no exception for
"economically motivated discrimination").
273. See Sweeney, supranote 61, at 1576-77 (arguing that disparate impact must be a part
of the ADEA so plaintiffs can challenge employers' conduct without rare evidence of intent);
,see also supranote 86 and accompanying text.
274. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 852 (1991) (amending
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 to include disparate impact). Title VII's disparate impact provision can be
found at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1994).
275. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-32 (1971) (establishing the disparate
impact approach in 1971); see also Rosenblum, supra note 106, at 432 (stating that "[it is
unremarkable" that neither Title VII nor the ADEA addressed the disparate impact theory which had not
yet been developed).
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the ADEA 76 This is consistent with the Wirtz Report's concern about highersalaried workers.277 Some courts have relied on language in the Hazen Paper
concurrence 27 that questioned the applicability of a disparate impact approach
under the ADEA. 279 However, as the Ninth Circuit has observed, until the

Supreme Court rules on this point, the question remains open and disparate
impact remains viable.28 °
In applying the disparate impact analysis, real force must be given to the
"business necessity" or "business justification" defense.28' Many of the early
cases held that economic reasons were insufficient to justify discrimination
under the Act.282 However, the Supreme Court, in the Title VII case Wards
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, decided that the business justification standard
does not require that the challenged conduct be "essential" or "indispensable,"

but "[a] mere insubstantial justification ... will not suffice. '283 Subsequent
ADEA decisions have diluted the concept of business justification28 4 to the
point that research has disclosed no ADEA case where a proffered justification
was rejected as "insubstantial" under the Wards Cove approach. In practical
application then, the defense provides employers near carte blanche permission
for opportunistic firings. 25" To provide sufficient protection for older workers,
the defense should be interpreted as requiring some significant showing by an
employer.
A difficult issue is presented by an alternative to salary-based terminations.
If allowed, employers could require older workers to accept reduced salaries
instead of terminations. This approach has some appeal for both employers and
employees. Employers in dire economic straights may want this option, and

276. See Alexander, supra note 22, at 108 (stating that the "ADEA's statutory
language... indicate[s] a clear Congressional intent to permit disparate impact analysis in age
discrimination suits). But see Sweeney, supra note 61, at 1573 (stating that the text and
legislative history of the ADEA are inconclusive on whether the Act allows disparate impact
claims).
277. See supra notes 239-42 and accompanying text.
278. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
279. See Mullin v. Raytheon Co., 164 F.3d 696, 701 (Ist Cir. 1999) (holding that disparate
impact does not apply under the ADEA and citing cases that have so held). However, note that
the Mullin court omitted consideration of the statutory word reasonable from its statutory
construction analysis. Id. at 701-02. See alsosupra notes 267-69 and accompanying text.
280. Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1291 & n.6 (9th Cir. 2000) (assuming
that disparate impact is still a viable approach), cert. denied sub nom., Gentile v. Quaker Oats
Co., 121 S. Ct. 2592 (2001).
281. See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
283. 490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989).
284. E.g., Michas v. Health Cost Controls of Ill., Inc., 209 F.3d 687,694-95 (7th Cir. 2000)
(stating that a company need not be "financially desperate" in order for economic reasons to
constitute a legitimate justification); Abbott v. Fed. Forge, Inc., 912 F.2d 867, 875 (6th Cir.
1990) (stating that an employer's practice that saved pension costs was based on a legitimate
business interest, because a practice need not be "essential" to be acceptable).
285. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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some of the threatened employees themselves may prefer a pay cut to outright
termination. On the other hand, pay cuts are problematic in that employers may
not wish to risk the employee disgruntlement pay cuts may create. More
important, allowing pay cuts to be forced on older workers seems directly
contrary to the purpose of the ADEA. 216 If allowed, such cuts might become
widespread, essentially gutting the ADEA. On balance, then, this approach
does not seem viable and is not recommended here.
2. Statutory Changes
Congress, too, could recognize that allowing salary-based terminations of
older workers is poor public policy and implement the above changes without
waiting for the courts to act. It could begin by reopening hearings on the issues
covered by the ADEA. If it finds grounds to act, Congress could amend the
ADEA to include language explicitly allowing claims arising from salary-based
terminations." 7 Alternatively, Congress could expressly reinstate the age proxy
just as it previously reinstated overturned
and disparate impact theories,
28
approaches under Title VII. 1
State legislatures could also act.2 9 After Marks v. Loral29 barred ADEA
and state law claims arising from a salary-based termination, the California
legislature expressly overrode that decision."sg The new California statute
declares a legislative intent to override Marks, approves both the disparate
treatment and the disparate impact methods of proof, and encourages courts to
interpret age discrimination statutes "broadly and vigorously" to protect older
workers both as individuals and as a group. 292

286. Judge Easterbrook thought "[i]t would be a shocking violation ofthe ADEA" to allow
age-based salary reductions. Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc., 828 F.2d 1202, 1213 (7th Cir. 1987)
(Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
287. See Alexander, supranote 22, at 107 (arguing that Congress, not the courts, should
debate and decide "whetherprotecting older workers is more important than the desire to become
the most economically-efficient business organization one can be"); Harper, supranote 24, at
787 (stating that "Congress could in part overrule HazenPaper"by providing that salary cannot
be used as a justification for discharging older workers); Sweeney, supra note 61, at 1577
(recommending that Congress amend the ADEA to provide for disparate impact analysis).
288. See 1 ROTHSTEINT AL., supra note 23, § 2.37, at 332.
289. The ADEA contains no blanket preemption of state legislation on the subject of age
discrimination. See I EGLrr, supranote 22, § 2.05. Some states have enacted statutes that afford
greater protection against age discrimination than does the ADEA. Id. In fact, the research
materials for the Wirtz Report listed and commended state laws on the subject. RESEARCH
MATERIALS, supranote 114, at 109-33.
290. 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d I (Ct. App. 1997); see supranote 59 and accompanying text.
291. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12941.1 (West Supp. 2001).
292. Id. The following is the text of the statute:
The Legislature hereby declares its rejection of the court of appeal opinion
in Marks v. Loral Corp. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 30, and states that the
opinion does not affect existing law in any way, including, but not limited
to, the law pertaining to disparate treatment. The Legislature declares its
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The California statute goes far toward ameliorating the problems discussed
in this Article. 3 However, it has not yet been interpreted by the courts, and its
application where a sole worker is affected by a salary-based termination is
unclear. It unequivocally allows salary-based claims that affect older workers
"as a group," but it does not mention individuals in that same sentence.
However, its announced intent that older workers be protected "as individuals"
may mean salary-based claims are available to individuals as well. 29
Terminations of sole individuals do occur; the Metz and Marks cases are
perhaps the best-known examplesas9 The aggrieved individual worker is no less
in need of redress because she stands alone. State legislatures should carefully
consider this issue in drafting statutes aimed at remedying salary-based
terminations of older workers.
VI. CONCLUSION

Recently, terminations of older, more highly paid workers in favor of
younger, cheaper workers have become widespread. At the same time, instead
of recognizing an increased need to protect older workers, courts have become
less willing to provide them redress under the ADEA. The courts are allowing
bottom-line profits to justify salary-based terminations, while ignoring their
negative effects. This tyranny of the bottom line creates bad public policy, as
data and commentary from the disciplines of sociology, economics,
psychology, and business suggest. The current policy harms the discharged
workers and sends surviving workers the disillusioning message that their best
efforts will only set them up as prime candidates for termination.

intent that the use of salary as the basis for differentiating between
employees when terminating employment may be found to constitute age
discrimination if use of that criterion adversely impacts older workers as
a group, and further declares its intent that the disparate impact theory of
proof may be used in claims of age discrimination. The Legislature further
reaffirms and declares its intent that the courts interpret the state's statutes
prohibiting age discrimination in employment broadly and vigorously, in
a manner comparable to prohibitions against sex and race discrimination,
and with the goal of not only protecting older workers as individuals, but
also of protecting older workers as a group, since they face unique
obstacles in the later phases of their careers. Nothing in this section shall
limit the affirmative defenses traditionally available in employment
discrimination cases including, but not limited to, those set forth in Section
7286.7 of Title 2 of the California Code of Regulations.
Id.
293. At the time of this writing, the one case citing Section 12941.1 is Guz v. BechtelNat I
Corp., 8 P.3d 1089 (Cal. 2000), which was decided on evidentiary grounds not requiring
interpretation of the statute. Id. at 1121.
294. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12941.1 (West Supp. 2001).
295. Id.
296. See Metz v. TransitMix, Inc., 828 F.2d 1202, 1203 (7th Cir. 1987); Marks, 68 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 4.
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Putting some limits on salary-based terminations would better implement
the language and purpose of the ADEA and would create better public policy.
To effect this change, courts could allow a broad application of the age-proxy
theory and confirm the viability and importance of the disparate impact
approach. Alternatively, Congress or state legislatures could enact legislation
to clarify the availability of effective redress for workers whose only
transgression is being more experienced and therefore more highly paid than
their juniors.
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